

COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF OVERSEAS MILITARY  
FACILITY  
STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

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PUBLIC HEARING

+ + + + +

TUESDAY,  
MARCH 1, 2005

+ + + + +

The hearing convened in Room 138 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, 1<sup>st</sup> and C Streets, N.E., Washington, D.C., pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m., Al Cornella, Chairman, presiding.

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

AL CORNELLA	Chairman
LEWIS CURTIS, III	Vice Chairman
ANTHONY LESS	Commissioner
KEITH MARTIN	Commissioner
H.G. TAYLOR	Commissioner

PANELISTS:

DOUGLAS J. FEITH	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
VADM ROBERT F. WILLARD	Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J8), Joint Chiefs of Staff
AMB. ROSE M. LIKINS	Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

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A-G-E-N-D-A

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

9:00 a.m.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. This hearing constitutes the fourth public meeting of the Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, more commonly known as the Overseas Basing Commission.

My name is Al Cornella, and I serve as the Commission's Chairman. Other Commissioners present today are, from my far right, the Commission Vice-Chairman, Lewis Curtis, Major General, United States Air Force, retired; Anthony Less, Vice Admiral, United States Navy, retired; Pete Taylor, Lieutenant General, United States Army, retired; and Keith Martin, Brigadier General, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, retired.

And I would also like to introduce the Commission's Executive Director, Ms. Patricia Walker. The Overseas Basing Commission was established by Public Law in fiscal year 2004.

The Commission's task is to independently

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1 assess whether the current overseas basing structure  
2 is adequate to execute current missions and to  
3 assess the feasibility of closures, realignments or  
4 establishment of new installations overseas to meet  
5 emerging defense requirements.

6 The Commission's work is not intended to  
7 preclude the Department of Defense's effort toward  
8 establishing the -- an Integrated Global Presence  
9 and Basing Strategy; rather, the Commission report  
10 will assist congressional committees in performing  
11 their oversight responsibility for DOD's (Department  
12 of Defense's) basing strategy, military  
13 construction, and appropriations in the 2005 Base  
14 Closure and Realignment Commission determinations.

15 This commission has been active since May  
16 2004 and has conducted previous hearings where we  
17 received testimony from former military experts,  
18 defense analysts, and experts on military family  
19 issues.

20 We have engaged in briefings from the  
21 Department of Defense, State Department, the  
22 Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional

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1 Research Service, and other entities.

2 The Commission has met with commanders and  
3 received extensive briefings on the transformation  
4 plan for the European Command and the repositioning  
5 of forces in the Pacific Command.

6 We've visited military installations in  
7 several countries meeting with U.S. forces, subject  
8 matter experts, embassy representatives, foreign  
9 military officers, and local officials.

10 The Commissioners have also received  
11 briefings from the U.S. Central Command, U.S.  
12 Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command  
13 and U.S. Transportation Command.

14 In addition, a briefing was provided by  
15 the Commission to the Combatant Commanders  
16 Conference and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The  
17 Commission will provide Congress and the President  
18 with an interim report by March 31<sup>st</sup>, 2005, and the  
19 final report no later than August 15<sup>th</sup>, 2005.

20 At this point I would like to describe the  
21 procedure for today's hearing. We have two panels,  
22 and I will introduce each panel as they appear.

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1 Each panelist will receive up to ten minutes for an  
2 opening statement.

3 At the conclusion of all opening  
4 statements, each Commissioner will have up to ten  
5 minutes to question the panel. At the end of that  
6 round each Commissioner will have an opportunity to  
7 address an additional question to the witness.

8 We will use lights as a courtesy reminder.  
9 When the yellow light appears you have two minutes  
10 remaining. When the red light appears, time has  
11 expired. However, I would ask the panelists to  
12 please take the time necessary to complete your  
13 comments.

14 Joining us today on our first panel are  
15 two distinguished members of the Department of  
16 Defense.

17 Douglas Feith is the Under Secretary of  
18 Defense for Policy. His responsibilities include  
19 the formulation of Defense planning, guidance, and  
20 forces policy, Department of Defense relations with  
21 foreign relations and the Department's role in the  
22 U.S. Government inter-agency policy making. From

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1 March 1984 until September 1986, Mr. Feith served as  
2 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
3 Negotiations Policy.

4 Also with us is Vice Admiral Robert  
5 Willard, the Director of Force Structure, Resources  
6 and Assessment at the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7 We had requested the Service Chiefs to  
8 testify before us, but understand that Vice Admiral  
9 Willard is representing their interests. Some of  
10 our questions may require detailed information.

11 The Commission respectfully asks that the  
12 information be provided for the record within 15  
13 days of these questions -- those that cannot be  
14 adequately answered here today.

15 Now, it's my understanding Mr. Feith will  
16 need to depart around 11:00 or shortly before 11:00.  
17 Okay. So, the Commissioners would first then like  
18 to address our questions to Mr. Feith and reserve  
19 the questions for Admiral Willard until such time as  
20 Mr. Feith departs or all questions to Mr. Feith have  
21 been addressed.

22 At this point I will begin the

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1 questioning. Excuse me, I'm going to first call on  
2 you for your opening statement, Secretary Feith.

3 SECRETARY FEITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,  
4 members of the Commission. It's good to have this  
5 opportunity to talk with you. I thought it would be  
6 useful to review for the Commission the strategic  
7 ideas that guided the work in our defense posture  
8 realignment.

9 When various ideas about realignment came  
10 to Secretary Rumsfeld, he said that he wanted to  
11 approach the subject strategically. He wanted to  
12 know what were the main thoughts that we should all  
13 have in our heads as we think about the numerous  
14 specific decisions that have to be made regarding  
15 realignment.

16 And I can summarize those main thoughts as  
17 follows:

18 First, we are interested in having a  
19 posture that expands allied roles and builds new  
20 partnerships with other countries.

21 The network of alliances and partnerships  
22 that we have around the world is one of our

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1 principal strategic assets. And our ability to work  
2 with other countries is crucial to the  
3 accomplishment of many of our national security  
4 missions, including, in particular, prosecuting the  
5 war on terrorism.

6 And so, we wanted to have a posture that  
7 put us in a position where we can ensure that we are  
8 fulfilling our obligations to our allies and have  
9 the opportunity to work effectively with allies and  
10 partners around the world.

11 Second, develop flexibility to contend  
12 with uncertainty.

13 In some ways it may be the single most  
14 important or the most seminal strategic thought,  
15 this whole exercise, that we cannot predict the  
16 future.

17 As we have seen over and over again in the  
18 last dozen years and more that we have had to  
19 operate militarily -- whether it's in combat or in  
20 humanitarian interventions or otherwise -- we have  
21 had to operate militarily in places that even a few  
22 weeks before we didn't anticipate having to operate

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1 in.

2 The clearest examples from the recent  
3 period are Iraq back in 1990-91 and the Balkans.  
4 Certainly nobody expected to be at war in  
5 Afghanistan even a few hours before 9/11.

6 And we do not believe now, as we did  
7 during the Cold War, that we have a clear sense of  
8 where we're going to have to operate. One of the  
9 principal ideas of the Cold War was that we were  
10 going to base our forces where we believed they were  
11 going to be needed to fight.

12 Now the concept is that we have to be  
13 flexible to be able to operate anywhere on short  
14 notice and that we're going to have to, as it were,  
15 move to the fight.

16 I say fight, but I do want to emphasize  
17 that when we're talking about military operations  
18 we're not talking only about combat. We're also  
19 talking about the kind of relief operation that was  
20 just done for the tsunami in South Asia or the kinds  
21 of interventions we've had in Haiti or Liberia  
22 recently.

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1           In any event, the thought is we're going  
2           to have to move to be able to operate, rather than  
3           assume that we're based near the theater of  
4           operations.

5           Third, we no longer have the idea that the  
6           forces are regional. We no longer use the  
7           terminology that was popular that combatant  
8           commanders own certain forces.

9           One of the points that Secretary Rumsfeld  
10          makes is none of our commanders own forces. We have  
11          a single force. It is owned by the American people.  
12          It can be used anywhere in the world.

13          And we have to manage our force globally.  
14          And so, there will be forces in a region. But those  
15          forces don't belong to that region. And they have  
16          to be able to move anywhere in the world that's  
17          required.

18          Fourth is the emphasis on rapidly  
19          deployable capabilities which, of course, ties into  
20          the point about flexibility to deal with  
21          uncertainty.

22          And, when we talk about rapidly deployable

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1 capabilities there's, of course, a lot in that  
2 concept. The emphasis on deployability means that  
3 there's a premium on lightness.

4 And, for lighter forces to have greater  
5 effects than in the past, it's important that those  
6 forces be precise. And, to be able to take  
7 advantage of the precision, we need better  
8 intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance  
9 capabilities. So, there is a lot that flows from  
10 this concept of flexibility and rapid deployability.

11 And then fifth, we're focused on  
12 capabilities -- not numbers.

13 When we look at our -- the force posture  
14 that we had around the world at the beginning of  
15 this administration, what we saw was that it was  
16 largely the legacy of World War II and the Korean  
17 War, as you know.

18 And, after the Cold War, there were  
19 substantial reductions made, but they were basically  
20 reductions in place. And we wound up with about  
21 100,000 forces in Europe and 100,000 in Asia.

22 And the figure 100,000 became something of

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1 a totem. And people ascribed to that 100,000 number  
2 great significance of the sign of our commitment to  
3 our obligations, our allies in the area.

4 We have worked very hard to explain to  
5 people that the key concept and the sign of our  
6 commitment is the capabilities that we have in an  
7 area or that we can bring into an area quickly.

8 And this idea of making a special fetish  
9 of a number is a strategic mistake in light of the -  
10 - of all the changes that have occurred in the  
11 capabilities of forces over recent years.

12 Now, when we talk about our Global  
13 Posture, we mean a lot more than basing. And one of  
14 the things I -- you, Mr. Chairman, made the point  
15 that your Commission is referred to as a base  
16 commission. And this exercise of our Global Posture  
17 realignment is often referred to as a change in  
18 basing. But I think it's important for me to stress  
19 that, when we think about posture, and when we use  
20 the term posture, we have more concepts in mind than  
21 simply facilities.

22 Facilities is certainly one aspect of

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1 posture. And, as you know, when we discuss  
2 facilities, we have three basic types of facilities  
3 in mind.

4 One is main operating bases; second is  
5 what we call forward operating sites, which involve  
6 less infrastructure, and they're basically warm  
7 facilities that can be used for contingencies; and  
8 the third is what we call a cooperative security  
9 location, which is not necessarily any permanent  
10 U.S. presence with personnel, but perhaps just an  
11 upgrade of infrastructure that would allow us to  
12 operate through an area or to do combined exercises  
13 or combined operations with the host country.

14 So, the first aspect of posture is  
15 facilities. The second is activities. Here we  
16 believe that the work that we do exercising with  
17 other countries, training other countries, is a  
18 crucial part of our posture in an area.

19 The third aspect is relationships. When  
20 we want to operate in the world and the President  
21 and his top advisors sit around to decide which  
22 partners do we want to ask to cooperate with us on a

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1 particular effort.

2           It turns out that the relationships that  
3 we have are really crucial, and the relationships  
4 come from things like regular meetings of top  
5 leaders, the kinds of meetings that we recently had  
6 here in Washington where the Japanese foreign and  
7 defense ministers came to meet with Secretary Rice  
8 and Secretary Rumsfeld. The military-to-military  
9 relationships that get created, those are all a key  
10 element of posture.

11           The fourth element is legal arrangements.  
12 One of the things that -- one of the lessons that we  
13 learned right after 9/11 was, when we were  
14 generously given facilities in Pakistan to support  
15 our operations in Afghanistan, we did not have the  
16 legal arrangements in place in the form of an  
17 acquisition and cross-servicing agreement that would  
18 allow us to reimburse the Pakistanis for the support  
19 they were providing us.

20           And we wound up running up hundreds of  
21 millions of dollars of bills. It was a terrible  
22 embarrassment and strain on the relationship. And

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1 the Pakistanis were very nice and indulgent about  
2 it. But it was very uncomfortable from our point of  
3 view to owe them those sums and not be able to  
4 reimburse them. We finally got the acquisition of  
5 cross-servicing agreement in place.

6 But one of the things it drove home was  
7 how important it is to have in place in advance  
8 acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, status  
9 of forces agreements, Article 98 agreements under  
10 the -- that relate to the International Criminal  
11 Court Treaty and other types of protections and  
12 assurances of freedom of action, the whole range of  
13 legal arrangements so that we can operate with  
14 friends and partners as required.

15 And part of our posture realignment is  
16 getting that legal infrastructure in place around  
17 the world.

18 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Mr. Feith, I need to  
19 interrupt you at this point because, in order to  
20 have time for a round of questions, I would like to  
21 take the remainder of your opening statement and  
22 enter it into the transcript of the hearing.

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1           We do have it here. And, Admiral Willard,  
2           I'd like you to wait with your opening statement  
3           until the time that we question you. So, if we  
4           could proceed at this point with the questioning, if  
5           you agree please.

6           SECRETARY FEITH: Go ahead.

7           CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: I guess my first  
8           question would be in regard to the person that has  
9           the over-arching responsibility in regard to  
10          planning and implementation of IGPBS (Integrated  
11          Global Presence and Basing Strategy).

12          I take it that is your position, is that  
13          correct?

14          SECRETARY FEITH: I would say it's the  
15          Secretary. But, we advise the Secretary on the  
16          posture realignment. And it's actually a process  
17          that involves a lot of players, in particular  
18          including the combatant commanders.

19          CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay, next to the  
20          Secretary then, I assume that you would be the  
21          person most knowledgeable within the Department of  
22          Defense in regard to IGPBS as we ask our questions.

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1 That's really what I'm trying to determine.

2 SECRETARY FEITH: Well, I think I'm  
3 reasonably knowledgeable about the effort. But, as  
4 I said, it's an effort that cuts across the whole  
5 department.

6 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: My first question is  
7 in regard to the global basing or re-basing effort.  
8 You know, there's not much question that gives us a  
9 posture to overcome the threats posed by the global  
10 war on terrorism. But how does this posture that's  
11 currently envisioned enhance our capabilities to  
12 support a protracted conflict, our treaty and  
13 security commitments, and a challenge by near-peer  
14 competitors?

15 SECRETARY FEITH: You talked about  
16 protracted conflict, peer competitor, and what was  
17 the second item?

18 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, I think what I'm  
19 asking is in regard to a traditional threat. It  
20 seems that this alignment, some people think, is  
21 more to fight a global war on terrorism rather than  
22 to deal with traditional threats. So, that's the

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1 basis of my question.

2 SECRETARY FEITH: I see. Well, Mr.  
3 Chairman, that is not the way we see it. The  
4 concept behind the realignment is to be able to move  
5 forces effectively.

6 So, we want to have the kind of posture  
7 around the world that allows us to do the movement,  
8 support, sustaining of forces anywhere that they  
9 might have to operate, whether it's for an operation  
10 in the war on terrorism or a -- as you put it -- a  
11 more conventional kind of conflict with a peer  
12 competitor.

13 And the other thought, as I said before,  
14 is that our view is -- however we might have to  
15 operate, in whatever type of conflict -- we are  
16 likely to want the ability to operate with allies  
17 and partners in coalition warfare.

18 And what we are doing with this posture  
19 realignment is aiming to increase our capability to  
20 work with other countries. And part of the reason  
21 we're talking about creating the kinds of facilities  
22 that we have in mind is precisely to be able to

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1 increase our ability to do training exercises,  
2 develop the relationships with other countries so  
3 that we make the opportunities for coalition warfare  
4 greater.

5 And I think all of that serves not just  
6 the purposes of the war on terrorism but the other  
7 purposes that you outlined.

8 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: A public release of  
9 the list of overseas bases to be closed or vacated  
10 has not been made. And we can understand the  
11 reasons why.

12 When do you anticipate that an  
13 unclassified list of overseas base closings will be  
14 made available to this Commission?

15 SECRETARY FEITH: This gets into the  
16 important question of the process by which decisions  
17 about the posture realignment are being made. And  
18 I'm glad for the opportunity to point out that there  
19 is a -- evidently -- a rather widespread idea that  
20 the posture realignment at some point is going to  
21 reach the stage where a comprehensive set of  
22 decisions in effect gets handed down from an

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1 Olympus. That's not going to happen.

2 What we are doing is we have a number of  
3 ideas on how we want to move -- realign forces and  
4 change facilities. Each of those ideas requires  
5 engaging with the host countries.

6 And, depending on how the talks with those  
7 host countries go on a whole range of issues -- real  
8 estate issues and co-station support issues and  
9 freedom of action issues and this legal  
10 infrastructure that I was referring to -- and a  
11 whole set of considerations. Depending on how those  
12 talks go, we may not be able to do what we consider  
13 to be our first choice, in which case we're going to  
14 have to be making adjustments.

15 And, since a lot of this, as you can  
16 imagine, is interconnected, if you adjust in one  
17 area, it's going to cost us to have to make  
18 adjustments in another area.

19 So, what the Secretary has set up here is  
20 a rolling process where there will be -- and that's  
21 why I don't think that there will be a time when we  
22 will be able to say to the Commission, okay, here is

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1 the complete set of facilities that we're changing,  
2 because different decisions and different areas  
3 depend on negotiations that are yet to occur with  
4 countries in other areas.

5 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, in that regard,  
6 then would it be fair to say that there's not really  
7 a cohesive plan, that there's more of an over-  
8 arching outline of what you want to accomplish, and  
9 that the plan is still in flux? Or how would you  
10 state that?

11 SECRETARY FEITH: No, I would say that  
12 there is a plan. But the plan takes into account  
13 that key decisions are going to be affected by what  
14 other governments do.

15 And so -- we can't impose ourselves on  
16 other countries. And the plan is to pursue certain  
17 ideas that we think are workable. Whether they're  
18 ultimately implementable will hinge on the  
19 negotiations, the consultations that we have with  
20 other countries.

21 By the way, we have had very extensive  
22 consultations in every theater around the world,

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1 every region around the world -- with countries --  
2 on the strategic concepts behind the realignment and  
3 the specific interest that we have in those  
4 countries in changing our posture.

5 And so, at this point, I think we have a  
6 general idea of the receptiveness of countries to  
7 our basic ideas. But there are always details to be  
8 worked out.

9 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, I notice that  
10 most of the actions, at least sizeable, that are  
11 going to take place within IGPBS have been announced  
12 in regard to the President's announcements and other  
13 notices that we have noticed in the press.

14 So, I guess I'm in a little bit of a  
15 quandary to understand if -- as you remove forces  
16 from a place with the idea that you may not be able  
17 to relocate there, that we're implementing actions  
18 at this point, are we in some cases doing it ahead  
19 of those agreements that you mentioned being made?

20 SECRETARY FEITH: Any action we take is  
21 going to be based on having what we considered to be  
22 our minimum requirements in a given place. Let me

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1 see if I can give you an example or two.

2 In some cases, we've talked with countries  
3 about their willingness to take perhaps a deployment  
4 of some forces into their territory. And they've  
5 said, yes, in principal, they're happy to do it.

6 But then we get into legal discussions  
7 with them about our ability to deploy out of the  
8 country under different circumstances. As you know,  
9 we have arrangements with some countries that put  
10 limits on our ability to deploy.

11 In some cases -- in NATO (North Atlantic  
12 Treaty Organization) countries, for example -- there  
13 are limits that, if it's a NATO mission, then the  
14 countries can deploy freely. But if it's not a NATO  
15 mission, then there are certain governmental  
16 permissions that are required before we can deploy.

17 We need clarification on circumstances  
18 like that, because we don't want to be in a position  
19 where we have forces forward deployed and then we  
20 can't use them in a contingency.

21 If we've decided that we want forces in an  
22 area and it just depends on working out these legal

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1 arrangements, then, once the legal arrangements get  
2 made, we can go forward.

3 If they don't get made, then the unit that  
4 we were planning to put in is going to have to go  
5 elsewhere, and we will have to talk to other  
6 countries.

7 It is clear to us that we have a lot of  
8 options. There are lots of countries that are very  
9 eager to cooperate with us on the posture  
10 realignment.

11 In fact -- I mean, one of the more  
12 interesting aspects, as we've gone around the world  
13 in the very extensive consultations that we've had,  
14 is how countries in many cases are pressing us to do  
15 a lot more in their country than we are currently  
16 contemplating doing.

17 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Why are force  
18 movements being accomplished now before BRAC (Base  
19 Realignment and Closure) has decided the final  
20 destination of CONUS (Continental United States)-  
21 bound forces?

22 SECRETARY FEITH: On the issue of BRAC --

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1 and Admiral Willard may want to jump in here and add  
2 a point -- the BRAC process, as you know, is moving  
3 forward according to the statute.

4 What was necessary to support the BRAC  
5 process, with regard to this Global Posture  
6 realignment, was our providing last summer the --  
7 what we believed was going to be the gross number of  
8 forces, family members, and contractors that we  
9 anticipated would be coming from overseas to back to  
10 the United States as a result of the realignment.

11 And, while a lot of the details, as I  
12 said, remain to be worked out, we did have a sense  
13 of -- we think -- a pretty good sense of what that  
14 gross number was.

15 And it's about 70,000 military members  
16 coming back, and approximately 100,000 family  
17 members and contractors coming back. That is what  
18 was necessary to feed into the BRAC process to allow  
19 the BRAC process to proceed, you know, according to  
20 its rules.

21 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay, thank you. What  
22 I'm going to do at this time is I'm going to cease

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1 my questioning. I want to increase the time for  
2 Commissioners to 12 minutes, Mr. Timer.

3 And I want to go to Commissioner Curtis to  
4 question.

5 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Mr. Feith, we're  
6 looking at some pretty lean budget years ahead of  
7 us. You know that better than I do. We've been  
8 through those before.

9 And there's always great pressure on O&M  
10 (Operations and Maintenance) funds in lean budget  
11 years because that's where the closest payback comes  
12 from. The idea of rotational forces depends heavily  
13 upon O&M funds to accomplish the rotation.

14 And they seem to me to be one of the  
15 potential big target in future years as that portion  
16 of the budget goes. And particularly so since the  
17 supported commander, the customer, if you will, of  
18 the rotational forces -- it's not necessarily the  
19 guy who funds them, as I understand the process.

20 Will you share with us your thoughts on  
21 how we'll be able to consistently support the  
22 rotational requirements of IGPBS and these tight

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1 budget years? And also, your ideas on how we will  
2 allow these rotational -- the funds to support  
3 rotational forces to compete effectively within the  
4 budget process.

5 I understand they can't be protected.  
6 But, you know, their ability to compete is  
7 important.

8 SECRETARY FEITH: General Curtis, your  
9 point about rotational forces is correct. There is  
10 a -- one of the themes of the realignment is that we  
11 are going to have, generally, a lighter footprint  
12 around the world.

13 And this is part of the strategic idea of  
14 being able to work more effectively with our friends  
15 and partners. We have found that, as eager as many  
16 of our partners are to work with us, there are  
17 problems, irritations that come into the  
18 relationship from having an excessively heavy  
19 footprint.

20 So there has been a stress on removing  
21 those irritations and lightening the footprint. And  
22 so there is a greater emphasis on rotational forces.

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1 That's also -- the ability to reach, touch many of  
2 our partners around the world is increased if we  
3 have more rotations.

4 And so there is a, I think, strong  
5 strategic rationale for the idea of rotations. Now,  
6 as to the specific point on how the O&M money  
7 connects to that, I think I'll ask Admiral Willard  
8 to address that.

9 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Thank you, sir. I  
10 think when you describe lean and O&M: I think our  
11 O&M accounts across the Services have been pretty  
12 well protected in these budget years.

13 And I think this current President's  
14 budget is a good illustration of that. So -- from  
15 an O&M account, readiness account concern -- the  
16 Services are in pretty good shape.

17 When we talk about rotational forces  
18 overseas, we're really talking competition among the  
19 COCOMs (Combatant Commanders) and priorities around  
20 the world. And the COCOMs get a vote in this.

21 Through their Service components, they are  
22 actually employing their rotational forces. And

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1 their priorities, and certainly the Department's  
2 priorities around the world, pretty much dictate  
3 where the rotational forces may ebb and flow over  
4 time.

5 So, from a budgetary standpoint, I think  
6 our readiness accounts are pretty secure. From a  
7 rotational force standpoint, I think the combatant  
8 commanders are very much interested in the exercise  
9 requirements and the presence requirements that they  
10 desire be maintained.

11 They articulate those, I think, pretty  
12 soundly to the Secretary. And, by and large, those  
13 requirements are being met, or will attempt to be  
14 met in the future current operations.

15 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Okay, thank you. A  
16 second question that's related, and that deals with  
17 mobility -- clearly more rotational forces implies  
18 more strategic lift.

19 And although we clearly -- they're  
20 referenced to lighten the forces. Things like armor  
21 on support vehicles makes both the Army and Marine  
22 forces potentially heavier than they've been in the

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1 past, rather than lighter.

2 And, I'd like your comments on whether the  
3 10-30-30 requirements, you know, for two successive  
4 activities, and the other impacts on strategic lift,  
5 are being adequately addressed.

6 And the Mobility Capability Study that's  
7 underway -- and, assuming they are, your assessment  
8 of the likelihood of funding those strategic airlift  
9 capabilities in the future.

10 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The Mobility  
11 Capability Study is due to readout within the  
12 Department at the end of March. And, indeed, it  
13 does view into the capability of our strategic lift  
14 forces to accommodate both major combat operations,  
15 as well as deployments around the world in peace  
16 time and contingency, as well.

17 So, that study is indeed going to inform,  
18 as you suggest, the program with regard to strategic  
19 lift. I'm not sure that IGPBS, the Global Posture  
20 strategy, is necessarily placing more demand on  
21 strategic lift and mobility than we currently  
22 experience.

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1           There is, in fact, shaping going on among  
2           the Services to make themselves lighter, more  
3           rapidly deployable. While there are some forces  
4           returning to CONUS, in particular Army from Europe,  
5           they are going to be modularized into brigade combat  
6           teams that should be -- meet our deployability  
7           requirements.

8           So I think, on the whole, our ability to  
9           take the future force -- which is really the modular  
10          and future forces of our ground components, the  
11          fleet response plan, postured maritime component,  
12          and the air expeditionary force air component -- I  
13          think we will have a force that will be accommodated  
14          by what is programmed -- and what will be informed  
15          by the Mobility Capability Study to be programmed in  
16          the future -- with regard to meeting those speed  
17          constructs, 10-30-30, as you described.

18                 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Right. And -- I've  
19                 watched the strategic lift process for many years.  
20                 And frequently it doesn't work out as planned for a  
21                 whole lot of reasons.

22                 Will the re-basing of our forces, the

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1 IGPBS, be paced by the availability of strategic  
2 lift as it actually comes on line rather than as  
3 currently programmed?

4 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Paced by it? I  
5 don't think so. When you view into the Global  
6 Posture construct, which has elements of forward  
7 operating sites and our cooperative security  
8 locations around the world, those are accesses and  
9 partnerships that we desire regardless of the state  
10 of play, necessarily, of our strategic lift forces.

11 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: I understand.

12 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: They are certainly  
13 the sites in which our strategic lift forces may  
14 access and where our rotational forces may, in fact,  
15 go. But, in terms of the program -- strategic lift  
16 program necessarily pacing IGPBS, I don't think so.

17 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Okay. Thank you.

18 SECRETARY FEITH: There's also -- when we  
19 think about lift -- there's also the plans that have  
20 -- we've worked on incorporating into the re-  
21 posturing, to have facilities along what we consider  
22 to be likely major transport routes so that we can

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1 service our aircraft, our ships so that we can pre-  
2 position wisely.

3 One element of what we're doing is looking  
4 seriously at the whole pre-positioning issue and  
5 getting the pre-positioning done in the right places  
6 and in the right configurations.

7 And, you know, all of that is with the  
8 overall concept of lift capability in mind.

9 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Less?

10 COMMISSIONER LESS: Moving to a Pol-Mil  
11 (Political-Military) geopolitical-type question, I  
12 guess, more along those lines: clearly the Global  
13 Posture Review is a work in progress, a mechanism,  
14 as you point out very nicely in your opening  
15 statement, to do what we need to do with  
16 relationships and so forth.

17 Do you see a need for increasing or  
18 additional U.S. presence in different areas of the  
19 world, from a geopolitical perspective, and why?

20 SECRETARY FEITH: The -- you use the term  
21 "presence," which I think is a good, rich term. It  
22 has all the same facets, I think, as the concept of

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1 "posture" that I was talking about before.

2 I think we do need to have a presence, in  
3 one way or another, all over the world. That  
4 doesn't mean having facilities all over the world.  
5 It doesn't mean having our forces stationed all over  
6 the world.

7 But, the idea that we are present, either  
8 through the relationships that we have -- the  
9 bilateral defense meetings, the Mil-to-Mil exchanges  
10 -- or we're doing operations or combined exercises,  
11 for example, in an area.

12 Or we're doing -- to take on a recent  
13 initiative that the -- of the President, the Global  
14 Peace Operations Initiative, where we're talking  
15 about training forces in various parts of the world  
16 to do peace operations.

17 All of those are part of presence. And I  
18 would add: one additional element of posture, of  
19 presence is surge capability. And we believe that  
20 when we talk about the key concept being  
21 capabilities -- not numbers -- one of the things we  
22 have in mind is we have an effective presence in an

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1 area if we have the ability to surge rapidly the  
2 capabilities required into that area.

3 And I think the tsunami relief is an  
4 example of a very successful surge capability being  
5 used for humanitarian purposes. And we need to have  
6 that kind of surge capability for the whole range of  
7 military operations up through combat.

8 COMMISSIONER LESS: About, okay, permanent  
9 presence in certain areas -- I specifically talk to  
10 the CENTCOM AOR -- do you think it's necessary for  
11 stability in that region? And, if so, why?

12 SECRETARY FEITH: The -- I mean, as you  
13 know, we have recently gone the opposite way in some  
14 cases. In Saudi Arabia we -- after the main combat  
15 in Iraq, we lightened our footprint and moved out of  
16 Prince Sultan Air Base.

17 In some places, a permanent presence, and  
18 especially a substantial permanent presence, can do  
19 more harm than good to the relationship. In other  
20 places, a proper degree of presence can be very  
21 helpful.

22 I don't feel comfortable answering it for

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1 an entire region. It kind of depends, you know,  
2 place by place. You make calculations about what is  
3 welcome, what is best suited to serve common  
4 interests between us and our partners, and it  
5 varies.

6 COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you. In Europe  
7 then -- I understand your not wanting to take it on  
8 as an entire region, but let's switch to NATO.  
9 Participation in NATO -- at the troop level -- with  
10 the current plans, I think, will have a tendency to  
11 perhaps degrade the status of NATO.

12 As NATO attempts to transform to meet the  
13 challenge of the post-Cold War, will our U.S.  
14 presence and leadership and participation be  
15 sufficient in numbers to ensure that NATO does  
16 remain relevant or a relevant alliance?

17 And is there any way -- as, I guess, a  
18 follow-on sort of thing -- any metric or any way  
19 that you can come up with to measure that?

20 SECRETARY FEITH: Well, Admiral, the point  
21 that you raise was very much at the fore of our  
22 minds as we were doing our work on the realignment.

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1 We understood that there was a danger that people  
2 would see the kinds of adjustments that we're making  
3 in Europe, in particular, as a retrenchment, as a  
4 degrading of the status of NATO, as you put it.

5 That is emphatically not our intention.  
6 And I do not believe it will be the effect of what  
7 it is we're doing. And we've worked very hard in  
8 the way we have thought about the realignment, and  
9 the way we've conducted our consultations with our  
10 European allies to ensure that we avoid the pitfalls  
11 that I think you rightly warn about.

12 We consider NATO enormously important. I  
13 would say that, in fact, it is one of the major  
14 motivations for the whole posture realignment: that  
15 we were concerned that if we did not make the kinds  
16 of changes that we're talking about, it could  
17 endanger the alliance because the alliance -- we had  
18 a posture in Europe that was based on a different  
19 era, and it's expensive to maintain. It caused  
20 various problems. I'll give you an example of one  
21 immediate problem that related to the quality of  
22 life of our forces.

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1 Germany is a wonderful, hospitable place  
2 for our forces. It has been for decades. People  
3 liked being stationed there. And they liked having  
4 their families there.

5 Lately we find that, when families moved  
6 to Germany and then the servicemember deploys to  
7 Afghanistan or Iraq or some other place, the family  
8 is not so delighted now being separated from its  
9 extended family in the United States.

10 And it's basically a double separation.  
11 They're separated from the servicemember and they're  
12 separated from their extended family. And this is  
13 quite a hardship for our forces and their families.

14 The adjustments that we are making in  
15 Europe are going to put NATO in a position where it  
16 has more relevant capabilities because we're taking  
17 the forces that are less relevant to the  
18 contingencies of the future, we believe, and the  
19 heavier forces out.

20 We're going to be putting forward more  
21 deployable, more technologically capable, more  
22 militarily relevant forces. When I personally

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1 conducted some of the consultations with the Germans  
2 on the changes that we're making, and the German  
3 Government officials were not merely resigned to the  
4 changes we were making: they were enthusiastically  
5 supporting changes that we were making because they  
6 understood that it represented a commitment to the  
7 bilateral relationship with Germany and to the  
8 broader relationship with NATO.

9 I mean, it is interesting that Prime  
10 Minister (German Chancellor) Schroeder's advisor,  
11 Karsten Voigt -- when the issue of posture came up  
12 and was asked, is the United States undermining the  
13 relationship with Germany and NATO by the posture  
14 realignment -- said, this is positive.

15 Let's not make a crisis out of something  
16 that is, in reality, a success story. It's an  
17 expression of the fact that the Cold War is over and  
18 that Europe's division has been eliminated.

19 And, as I said, I think, at the end of the  
20 day, when we make the kinds of changes that we're  
21 making in the posture -- together with the kinds of  
22 changes that we're making in NATO, with the reform

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1 of NATO and the streamlining of NATO's command  
2 structure, the creation of the NATO response force,  
3 and other kinds of really useful changes that we've  
4 made over the last few years -- we are going to be  
5 in a position to ensure that NATO remains capable  
6 and sustainable and relevant for the future.

7 Because we value the alliance enormously,  
8 and we do not want to see it become a white  
9 elephant.

10 COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you, sir. I  
11 knew that, throwing a softball like that, you would  
12 pick up on it quite happily. I appreciate that. I  
13 have no further questions.

14 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Taylor?

15 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I'd like to return  
16 to resources for a moment. But, as you know better  
17 than most, the Department and the Services are  
18 extremely busy with a number of things right now:  
19 the Base Realignment and Closure coming up, the  
20 Mobility Capabilities Study, which you already  
21 mentioned, QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review), this  
22 Global Reposturing, the Service transformations that

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1 are all ongoing, rebalancing and resetting the  
2 forces that are coming back and going back and forth  
3 to the war, the overall global war on terrorism, and  
4 -- as well as what's happening in OIF (Operation  
5 IRAQI FREEDOM) and OEF (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM).

6 Some people would say that the resources  
7 required to do all that may be a bit difficult to  
8 obtain -- especially the people we represent that  
9 have to produce those resources.

10 What are you prepared to give up in order  
11 to meet all these competing resource demands? Or do  
12 you plan on giving up anything?

13 (No verbal response.)

14 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: And I would just add  
15 one other thing. As you know, although we're not  
16 involved in it, as you bring forces -- those 70,000  
17 -- back, they have to go some place.

18 And these places may not be prepared to  
19 take them. And there's got to be money set aside  
20 for that. And, as we've been told, that all comes  
21 out of the Service's budget right now.

22 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Well, there

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1 actually has been a resource in place to cover some  
2 of the BRAC expenses for some time over the FYDP  
3 (Future Years Defense Plan). So, in fact, where  
4 those forces that are redeploying back to CONUS will  
5 go is part of the ongoing BRAC study.

6 And, as you're very familiar, BRAC always  
7 has a cost associated with it. But, more  
8 importantly, in the out-years there's a considerable  
9 savings that the Department hopes to then gain, as  
10 well.

11 So, your point is taken. The comment  
12 regarding choices that will have to be made in order  
13 to resource the many things that are ongoing in the  
14 Department right now is, obviously, a valid one.

15 And part of the Defense Review that has  
16 commenced -- and will be completed in a year, or so  
17 -- is intended to inform that. The Global Posture  
18 will come with a cost. I mean, there's obviously  
19 resources that have to be put into this.

20 And we recognize that. And, while there  
21 are amounts associated with BRAC, there are  
22 estimates right now that are going right now that

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1 may vary and change as the negotiations flow over  
2 the coming year and years.

3 The off-sets for those will have to be  
4 competed across the Department and across, as you  
5 say, the Services. The purpose of the Defense  
6 Review -- which is probably central to answering  
7 your question -- is intended to look at a variety of  
8 different things.

9 But central to it is a capability mix  
10 study that's intended to attempt to reshape the  
11 Department -- the military forces -- to be more  
12 adaptable to both the traditional and less  
13 traditional challenges that we're going to face in  
14 the future.

15 And this includes adapting that force to  
16 the Global Posture that we're discussing here today.  
17 In addition, the Quadrennial Defense Review is  
18 intended to account for the trades that have to be  
19 made to accomplish that capability mix in the  
20 future.

21 And I think it will be successful in doing  
22 that. And captured in that are all of the moving

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1 parts that you allude to, to include global basing.

2 SECRETARY FEITH: If I may, General: you  
3 make a point that the Secretary makes all the time.  
4 And it's an important point. I'm glad you raised  
5 it. I mean, everything involves choices.

6 And if you're going to take on new  
7 missions, it's important to think about how -- what  
8 are the things that you're doing that aren't as  
9 important, that you can stop?

10 Or, what are the things that you're doing  
11 that are important but you can get other people to  
12 do? And, in some cases, we know that other people  
13 can do things that fall now to the U.S. military to  
14 do.

15 And other people can do them, in some  
16 cases, much better or more efficiently. And, to  
17 give you an example of how we're thinking along  
18 those lines, the President has just created in the  
19 State Department an Office of Reconstruction and  
20 Stabilization.

21 And part of the idea behind that office is  
22 to get the U.S. Government organized, government-

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1 wide, to be able to handle reconstruction and  
2 stabilization missions, and to have the people lined  
3 up, to have plans to be able to deploy civilians, to  
4 be able to do crucial missions: getting water  
5 systems going or electrical systems going in places,  
6 or setting up municipal administration or law  
7 enforcement apparatus somewhere.

8 Right now many of those missions fall to  
9 the military. But the military is not best suited  
10 to do them. And it would be an excellent thing for  
11 the U.S. Government to get much better organization  
12 to do them.

13 That office is being created at the State  
14 Department. I think it has great promise. We are  
15 supporting it and there are ideas that it's  
16 studying: for example, the concept of possibly a  
17 civilian reserve that can come in to assist in  
18 stabilization and reconstruction operations.

19 I do not know if that's practical. I do  
20 not know if it's affordable. But, if it existed,  
21 one imagines it could relieve stress on our force --  
22 on our military forces.

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1           So there's a way of looking inter-agency  
2           at how we can get certain missions that are now ours  
3           -- for the military -- done elsewhere and better.  
4           And then there's also the idea of doing it  
5           internationally.

6           And the President's Global Peace  
7           Operations Initiative is a -- an example of an  
8           effort to build international capacity to do peace  
9           operations -- and, in particular, those that are on  
10          the higher end: what are called peace enforcement,  
11          as opposed to just mere peacekeeping.

12          Right now, as you know, if there's a  
13          peacekeeping-type operation that's required to be  
14          done somewhere in the world -- and you need a few  
15          thousand forces to go in in four weeks -- how many  
16          countries in the world can do that? Very, very few.

17          There is a real premium in moving quickly,  
18          in some of these international crises, to prevent  
19          the crisis from becoming a war. But that creates a  
20          bind for us because we understand the importance of  
21          moving quickly.

22          But, if you have to move quickly -- and

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1 we're just about the only country in the world that  
2 can move quickly -- then everything falls on us.

3 Well, one of the ways we're trying to deal  
4 with that is we're talking about a plan that the  
5 President has laid out and has talked about doing  
6 jointly with the other G-8 countries: to get, over  
7 then next five years, 75,000 peacekeeping troops  
8 from various countries around the world trained up  
9 so that they have the capability and rapid  
10 deployment capability so that we're not the only  
11 country in the world that you can call on when you  
12 need that kind of a job done.

13 So, I want to re-emphasize how important  
14 the point you raised is and how we're trying to  
15 think it through from many angles, including the way  
16 we can get better organized -- inter-agency and  
17 internationally -- to handle the kinds of missions  
18 that are necessary for our country.

19 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: To follow on with  
20 that -- and also to come back to a comment you made  
21 earlier about this being more of a process rather  
22 than us coming down with the answer -- it would seem

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1 there are a number of unknowns out there.

2 The MCS (Mobility Capability Study) that  
3 you've talked about -- we've received a little  
4 different timeline than what you just told us.  
5 We're glad to know that it's going to be out in  
6 March. But that -- a number of other studies that  
7 are ongoing -- QDR -- would seem to have some impact  
8 on what you finally decide to do.

9 How critical is timing on this, from your  
10 standpoint? How quickly? As we travel around the  
11 world, we have different timelines that are posited  
12 for us there, you know.

13 But how quickly does this all have to  
14 happen? And what would be the impact of slowing it  
15 down and waiting for some answers to appear before  
16 irrevocable decisions are made?

17 SECRETARY FEITH: I'm sure that Admiral  
18 Willard would want to comment on this also. I would  
19 simply say that there are so many parts to this  
20 realignment that I don't think we can say that they  
21 are all urgent or none is urgent.

22 Some are more urgent than others. And

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1 there are certain things that we're interested in  
2 doing now -- that we believe are within the art of  
3 the possible now, for which the resources exist now  
4 -- that we would like to get moving on.

5 There are other things that we know, for  
6 any one of a number of reasons, are going to take  
7 many years to get underway. I think that certain  
8 things that we want to do promptly we will want to  
9 move out on, even before the QDR gets done.

10 But it is quite clear that, for the items  
11 that are longer lead-time items, the QDR will be  
12 able to inform our work on those longer lead-time  
13 items and may cause us to rethink or adjust our  
14 plans.

15 So it's not that everything is going to go  
16 without reference to the QDR, and it's not that  
17 everything's going to have to wait on the QDR.

18 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes, that's  
19 actually well-stated. There are some imperatives  
20 out there that the combatant commanders are highly  
21 interested in seeing advanced faster than others.

22 There are other longer term plans

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1 associated with the Global Posture that will occur  
2 across the FYDP. And, when we look at QDR and MCS  
3 and the other studies that you allude to, those are  
4 intended to inform the program.

5 So, those are intended to kind of take us  
6 from FY (Fiscal Year) 07 through the out-years. And  
7 the QDR is, I think, typically a 20-year look. The  
8 Secretary has asked the Department to view into --  
9 five to 20 years into the future.

10 And so there's already pretty good  
11 alignment, I think, between the IGPBS initiative --  
12 which the combatant commanders played very heavily  
13 in in order to have their needs met in view of our  
14 future strategies -- and the ongoing studies and the  
15 future program.

16 I mean, it's all designed to come  
17 together, I think, pretty well.

18 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Mr. Chairman, I have  
19 one more that will take just a second, just for the  
20 record, on this business about what will come down  
21 from another.

22 If you read the paper, some say that on

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1 the 16<sup>th</sup> of May the Secretary will give his  
2 recommendations where all the forces from the  
3 overseas IGPBS will be going.

4 I take from your comment that that will  
5 not happen.

6 SECRETARY FEITH: I believe you may be  
7 referring to the BRAC.

8 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Sir, there's -- a  
9 part of the BRAC submission will be a force  
10 structure submission that is due on the 15<sup>th</sup> of  
11 March.

12 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: You know better than  
13 we.

14 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The force structure  
15 is BRAC-related. So, to align that with IGPBS --  
16 the larger Global Posture -- I think, would be  
17 incorrect. That is intended to provide a view of  
18 the planned force structure across the Services,  
19 across the Future Years Defense Plan, which BRAC  
20 must accommodate, which is the alignment between the  
21 two.

22 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin?

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1                   COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much,  
2 Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Admiral: You both  
3 stressed flexibility in your comments as a goal of  
4 the posture view and system.

5                   And, as we understand it, there is a  
6 National Security Strategy, a National Defense  
7 Strategy, and a National Military Strategy, the  
8 latter of which we have not seen yet.

9                   We understand it was to be published, and  
10 then it was withdrawn and has not yet been fielded.

11                  How -- in your view, Mr. Secretary -- does global  
12 re-basing facilitate two particular elements, 1-4-2-  
13 1 and the 10-30-30, given the Iraq experience? I  
14 have some serious questions about those.

15                  VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The 1-4-2-1 current  
16 strategy -- first of all, the strategies, across the  
17 board, that you allude to are extremely important to  
18 us and the combatant commanders in terms of planning  
19 and alignment with not only the future, in terms of  
20 defense planning, but the present as well.

21                  The 1-4-2-1, which is our current force  
22 sizing construct, and the 10-30-30, which is our

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1 current speed construct -- both intended, really, to  
2 inform how we plan for future warfights -- are being  
3 analyzed through a series of operational  
4 availability studies, the most recent of which is  
5 reading out this month, Operational Availability 05.

6 And we're validating that, in fact, the  
7 future force structure and our future programs, that  
8 combine into our military capability, can meet those  
9 constructs.

10 I would also say that, while those  
11 strategies are currently informing the Defense  
12 Review that's ongoing, one of the outcomes of the  
13 Defense Review is intended to be a validation of or  
14 a recommendation for changes to those constructs, as  
15 well.

16 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: That was the follow-  
17 on question. Would there be the possibility of  
18 change in those strategies based on the outcomes of  
19 those views that are ongoing at OSD (Office of the  
20 Secretary of Defense) and within the National  
21 Security Council?

22 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Before I turn it

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1 over to Secretary Feith, I'd tell you that one of  
2 the things that has been most impressive, I think,  
3 in the Pentagon in the last several years has been  
4 the flexibility, the willingness to see -- whether  
5 it's the world changing around us and current  
6 operations, or the future challenges changing in  
7 terms of our view of the future world -- the  
8 willingness to look into our own strategies and our  
9 own plans and change those, as well, and even adjust  
10 our military capabilities across the board if that's  
11 what's needed.

12 So, I would venture to say, yes, that the  
13 Secretary, in particular, emphasizes the need to be  
14 aware of what is changing and be willing to change  
15 to adapt to it if need be.

16 SECRETARY FEITH: That is certainly  
17 correct. I mean, this is a fine thing and it's also  
18 a major source of work for us that the Secretary,  
19 whenever he adopts a set of strategic ideas on any  
20 subject, is inclined to look at them -- often within  
21 a few months.

22 And I'm not sure that in the four years

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1 that I've been in this job that the Secretary has  
2 ever looked at a set of strategic concepts, key  
3 assumptions, courses of action -- that he approved,  
4 that's a few months old -- and when he looks at them  
5 again, hasn't decided that they need to be changed.

6 He's a very big believer in updating  
7 everything -- and especially anything that's called  
8 a strategy -- on a rolling basis.

9 And so, I think that you could be  
10 confident that every piece of work that we do that  
11 creates a new thought, brings in a new concept, is  
12 going to be used as a way of reexamining all the  
13 other major pieces of work within the Department.  
14 It's just the way the Secretary operates.

15 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: My second question  
16 probably presages my Reserve Component background.  
17 There's such a thing as a pyrrhic victory where you  
18 win a battle and lose the war because there's nobody  
19 left to fight afterwards.

20 How much emphasis has been placed -- and  
21 this is both policy and a uniform question -- has  
22 been placed on really understanding the recruiting

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1 and retention dynamic across the Services -- AC and  
2 RC, Active Component and Reserve Component --  
3 particularly when we begin the process and lean  
4 forward toward using rotational forces that are  
5 posited to include Reserve Components.

6 We've heard from everyone we talk to that  
7 stability and predictability are two components of  
8 what it takes to maintain a strong, trained, ready  
9 force.

10 And we're wondering if that's cracking  
11 around the edges right now.

12 SECRETARY FEITH: It's a very important  
13 question. As you know, I'm not the personnel guy.  
14 But I know that as we've been doing our work on the  
15 posture realignment, we have been focused on how the  
16 changes we are making are going to affect quality of  
17 life for the forces.

18 I alluded earlier to this point that I  
19 think is not often focused on: When people talk  
20 about rotational presence, what I think they  
21 frequently are thinking about is, we're taking  
22 servicemembers away from their families.

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1           And, as I was pointing out, what we've  
2 noticed is the kinds of deployments that we have  
3 sometimes aggravate that problem with these so-  
4 called permanent stationing of people with their  
5 families in places that are abroad but not where the  
6 servicemembers have to operate.

7           And the work that is being done on the  
8 posture realignment, as Admiral Willard was alluding  
9 to before, is connected to the work that General  
10 Schoomaker (Chief of Staff Army) is doing in the re-  
11 organization of the Army.

12           The overall affect of changing the -- you  
13 know, this concept of unit of deployment, the  
14 modularity concept -- the overall affect of those  
15 changes and the posture realignment changes should  
16 be and is intended to be -- and General Schoomacher  
17 says it will be -- more predictability and more  
18 stability for forces than has existed to date.

19           There will be fewer permanent changes of  
20 station over the course of a career. And there will  
21 be a, just in general, greater stability for the  
22 servicemembers and their families.

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1           And that's been very much at the fore of  
2           the Secretary's mind as we've been making the  
3           changes. As I said, these pieces fit together; the  
4           posture realignment, the Army re-organization  
5           changes are of a piece.

6           VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The Active force's  
7           retention and recruitment right now appears to be  
8           very healthy. In the Reserve Component, there are  
9           some challenges.

10           And we're watching it very carefully.  
11           It's being trended. There are adjustments in the  
12           active Reserve mix that are being made and have been  
13           made. Tens of thousands of Reservist -- Reserve and  
14           Active adjustments being made to try to accommodate  
15           the force rotations in the current environment that  
16           are most stressing on the Reserve force.

17           So, there have been some transfers of  
18           responsibility we've taken in the course of some of  
19           the lesser-demand Reserve forces and shifted those  
20           into greater-demand areas.

21           So it is being reviewed, and recruitment  
22           and retention are also being incentivised. So, I

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1 mean, there are a lot of initiatives in play. And  
2 we're watching, again, particularly our Reserve and  
3 Guard components carefully, mainly driven by the  
4 current op tempo.

5 But the AC/RC mix -- the Active and  
6 Reserve mix, and getting that right -- is one of the  
7 important ingredients of the upcoming Defense  
8 Review. And, as I stated, it's already being  
9 adjusted, as we see the need to adjust it, based on  
10 current operations.

11 The modularity concept is intended to  
12 reduce the stress on, particularly, the ground force  
13 -- to include the Reserves in the ground force --  
14 whenever they're in a rotational environment, like  
15 the one they're in now, and not garrisoned during  
16 peacetime.

17 And by that -- by transitioning from that  
18 division-centric Army to a more brigade combat  
19 teams-centric force and increasing the number of  
20 brigade combat teams significantly across the Army,  
21 the force rotation ratio is predicted to improve.

22 And I think the (rotation ratio) numbers

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1 are 1:2 to 1:5 -- I'm sorry, one to two (1:2) to one  
2 to five (1:5), over time, Active and Reserve -- so  
3 there's a lot of concern to stay on top of exactly  
4 where we are with regard to recruitment or retention  
5 across the force.

6 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much,  
7 Admiral Willard. I'll yield the basis and balance  
8 of my time so the other commissioners can maybe get  
9 a follow-up to Mr. Feith.

10 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, I would ask, in  
11 the interest of time, rather than going around the  
12 table individually, just -- Is there a commissioner  
13 who has a follow-up question that is pressing?

14 (No verbal response.)

15 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay. What I'd like  
16 to do then is close the --

17 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Just one additional  
18 one on how we care for the forces that are returning  
19 to the United States. Well, I understand your point  
20 about military forces being deployed and leaving  
21 their families on foreign soil and their extended  
22 family here at home.

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1           Some of them, due to great work by folks  
2           like yourself, are living in some pretty nice  
3           places. They're going to have to come back to some  
4           places in the United States that may not be  
5           adequately prepared for them, both in terms of the  
6           infrastructure that is located within the fences of  
7           the base where they're going or the community in  
8           which they are going to go.

9           I would hope there's some type of plan not  
10          to bring them back to those communities until they  
11          are ready to take care of them. Can you assure us  
12          that there is such a plan?

13                         (No verbal response.)

14           COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Because -- since the  
15          Congress doesn't know where they're going and the  
16          people who are going to be receiving them don't know  
17          they're coming, there can be little program and then  
18          planning and budgeting for that, at this time.

19           VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes, again, because  
20          it's part of the BRAC process and it's on -- you  
21          know -- the decisions are ongoing and the resource  
22          decisions are linked very closely to that, and those

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1 resource decisions will affect timing, I can't give  
2 you an exact answer.

3 But I would tell you that the Army, in  
4 particular, because of the returning divisions from  
5 Europe, is very focused on where those divisions  
6 will be accommodated and the necessary improvements  
7 to the infrastructures around those.

8 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Really, the question  
9 I'm asking you is about timing. Can we be assured  
10 that we'll not bring them back until the facilities  
11 are available for them -- adequate facilities are  
12 available for them?

13 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think I'd prefer  
14 to get an answer from the Army on that particular  
15 question. If what you're alluding to is --

16 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I'm asking about all  
17 Services, not just the Army.

18 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes.

19 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I know the Army  
20 makes up the majority of the force coming back. But  
21 it affects more than just the Army. Okay, thank  
22 you.

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1                   CHAIRMAN CORNELLA:       Mr. Secretary, I  
2 understand you've announced your departure from the  
3 Department this summer. And, before I thank you for  
4 your service, I would like to ask one question about  
5 the replacement, the individual that would be  
6 overseeing IGPBS after your departure.

7                   Evidently -- you've probably identified  
8 someone that has the knowledge that you do of the  
9 process that will be taking your position.

10                  SECRETARY FEITH:       My principal deputy,  
11 Ryan Henry, is thoroughly knowledgeable about the  
12 subject, and he will help provide continuity. And  
13 then -- one would hope that somebody will actually  
14 be confirmed in this job before I leave.

15                  But that's out of the executive branch's  
16 control completely. Anyway, we'll hope that that  
17 gets done and the new person will be able to get up  
18 to speed quickly.

19                  CHAIRMAN CORNELLA:   Okay. Well, I'd like  
20 to thank you for your leadership and your visionary  
21 planning while you've been at the Department. I'd  
22 like to thank you for being here today as a courtesy

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1 to us, and also to express, you know, our great  
2 appreciation for the cooperation that we receive  
3 from Policy and from the Department and from the  
4 Combatant Commands.

5 Also, I am impressed by your expression of  
6 willingness to change or make course corrections as  
7 you go through this process. My earlier question  
8 about cohesive planning was not one which you would  
9 be so constricted to a plan that you would not make  
10 corrections. I thank you for that clarification.

11 Admiral Willard, I hope you can spend a  
12 few more minutes with us. We will provide  
13 transportation for you, if necessary.

14 So, Secretary Feith, thank you very much  
15 for appearing here today.

16 SECRETARY FEITH: Well, thank you, Mr.  
17 Chairman. And I would like to commend the  
18 Commission for the seriousness that you bring to  
19 your work and the contribution that you're making to  
20 this complex issue of our posture realignment. And  
21 it's good to work with you. Thank you.

22 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Excuse me. I turned

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1 my microphone off. One last thing on the threats.  
2 We would like to receive some more information in  
3 regard to threats.

4 We have received some. But we would like  
5 more in regard to the overall planning of IGPBS and  
6 relative to threats. Thank you. Admiral, would you  
7 mind if we just took a five minute break?

8 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Not at all, sir.  
9 Thanks.

10 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went  
11 off the record at 10:22 a.m. and went back  
12 on the record at 10:34 a.m.)

13 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Admiral, first of all,  
14 I'd like to thank you for your patience with our  
15 process today. With the other schedule we were  
16 trying to allow as much time as we could for  
17 Secretary Feith.

18 But I'd ask you at this point if you have  
19 an opening statement you'd like to make or submit.

20 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Nothing formal,  
21 sir. I would just like to say that, having returned  
22 to the Pentagon from the Pacific theater six months

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1 ago, and having been there when the IGPBS process  
2 was in play from the standpoint of the Pacific  
3 commander and his desires in terms of submission of  
4 requirements back to the building, I'm a fan.

5 I think the military value of what you're  
6 overseeing in this process is exceedingly good. I  
7 think that the traditional, you know, future  
8 competitor is accommodated in this.

9 In fact, in many cases, this will improve  
10 our ability to flex to various, you know,  
11 contingency spots in the future. And the fact that  
12 it realigns partnerships and realigns or  
13 accommodates accesses for us may preclude the need  
14 that we've seen in the past to conduct hasty  
15 negotiations to gain access or to gain overflight  
16 rights when contingencies do, in fact, erupt.

17 So this, you know, there's a great deal of  
18 goodness, I think, in what you're overseeing here.

19 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. I'm going  
20 to proceed to the far right to Commissioner Curtis  
21 to begin questioning.

22 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Admiral, I was

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1 delighted with your comments and the Secretary's  
2 comments over the fact that IGPBS is more of an  
3 evolving process than a single plan.

4 And I'm pleased that it's something  
5 clearly that will -- you envision as something that  
6 will change as it evolves. Since it's posturing us  
7 right now for something after 2010, which is when  
8 the last pieces of it seem to fall in place, I'd ask  
9 you, how do you plan to institutionalize this  
10 process as something that continues over time rather  
11 than what we have seen before where we kind of just  
12 ignore the overseas basing structure in any  
13 fundamental way?

14 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think I'd like to  
15 consider that it's institutionalized now; that it's,  
16 in fact, the solicitation of the combatant  
17 commanders' requirements

18 And part of those requirements are where  
19 he seeks access or seeks to have the capability to  
20 work with a coalition partner. That is part of the  
21 ongoing submission from the Combatant Command to the  
22 Department.

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1           And I would perhaps emphasize it this way.  
2           We recently collected Integrated Priority List  
3           inputs from all the combatant commanders. The  
4           European commander specified in his IPLs -- is what  
5           they're termed -- these requirements that have to do  
6           with European command, and specifically his desires  
7           with regard to a Global Posture and force rotations.

8           So he was identifying some of his needs --  
9           if he sees that lacking an opportunity to access or  
10          partner with a coalition partner is a gap, is  
11          missing in his particular area of responsibility.

12          So, while I can't refer you to a document  
13          associated with the institutionalization of this, I  
14          think the fact that this has been ongoing now for a  
15          number of years and the combatant commanders feel a  
16          sense of ownership associated with the Global  
17          Posture laydown input that they have made and that  
18          has been identified for their AORs (Areas of  
19          Responsibility), that it will be ongoing.

20          COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Does that mean this  
21          essentially is institutionalized as part of the QDR  
22          process? Or will the QDR process move on

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1 independently from this?

2 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: In the portion of  
3 the QDR that will examine capability mix, part of  
4 that examination is intended to determine that the  
5 capability mix is accommodated in this process.

6 So, much as we've alluded to, you know,  
7 the fact that this is a process and it is subject to  
8 reconsideration -- subject to review, ongoing --  
9 this is intended to help inform the current Defense  
10 Review process.

11 And the two are complimentary. I think  
12 they'll play off of one another as we examine or  
13 redefine a capability mix for the armed force -- the  
14 fact that those rapidly deployable forces and the  
15 defense planning scenarios, the contingency planning  
16 guidance, that currently exists out there must be  
17 accommodated.

18 We'll make a determination as to whether  
19 or not the force posture, the global laydown, can  
20 accommodate them. I would also say that in our  
21 ongoing analysis, the analytical agenda that you may  
22 or may not have heard, is fundamental to this

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1 capabilities-based planning effort in the  
2 Department.

3 In the Operational Availability studies,  
4 they are viewing our capability to conduct  
5 operations in out-years beyond the program. And  
6 they take into account accesses that IGPBS have  
7 identified.

8 And if that access is shown to be lacking  
9 in some way, then that reads out as an output from  
10 the OA (Operational Availability) study. And it can  
11 go on to become the basis for a review of this  
12 particular initiative.

13 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Okay. And one other  
14 quick question: When we saw General Jones  
15 (Commander, U.S. European Command), both he and his  
16 staff made a point of the importance of the CSLs  
17 (Cooperative Security Locations) in Africa.

18 When we take the overall map and look at  
19 it, the one place that jumps out at you is the lack  
20 of CSLs in the South American region. I'm not  
21 saying that's bad, but I'm interested in your  
22 comments on the lack of CSLs in South America.

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1           VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD:    I guess I would  
2           only point out that they're certainly part of the  
3           plan, and part of this process, and that the  
4           Southern Command commander has made his inputs with  
5           regard to where the basing and access and  
6           partnerships should be established throughout South  
7           America.

8           So, there have in, fact, been steps  
9           forward in Southern Command.   And, while not as  
10          robust appearing right now as the European emphasis  
11          on the African continent, we see it as a step  
12          forward.

13          And the Southern Command commander right  
14          now is enthusiastic about what he gains in the way  
15          that he's modified his accesses in South America.

16          COMMISSIONER CURTIS:   Perhaps we have just  
17          not seen the extent of the CSLs that are planned  
18          down there.   So, perhaps we'll come back in and ask  
19          to see those.

20          VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD:   Okay.   We'd be  
21          happy to kind of share what those plans are.

22          COMMISSIONER CURTIS:   Thank you very much,

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1 Admiral. That's all I have.

2 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Curtis?

3 (No verbal response.)

4 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Less?

5 COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you, Mr.  
6 Chairman. Admiral, you've come a long way since you  
7 used to fly my wing and I used to try to run you out  
8 of fuel. But, I would like to get a couple of --  
9 all your experience in the Pacific theater.

10 I would like to get you focused on a  
11 specific or two that has caused the Commission some  
12 concern during the course of our travels. And I  
13 cite a couple specific locations, like China and the  
14 Taiwan Straits and the Korean theater.

15 One question or one area, specifically,  
16 that I -- and it's making the press even today when  
17 we're talking about the SM3 (Standard Missile III)  
18 version of ballistic missile defense, and that sort  
19 of thing.

20 But -- it was a few years ago when I was  
21 on the Joint Staff, and I remember meeting in China  
22 at the Embassy with Ambassador Lord, back in those

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1 days -- I guess that was mid-80s -- when he laid out  
2 the Chinese philosophy for the future.

3 And the Chinese philosophy for the future  
4 was: Don't worry about anything other than the  
5 economy right now. And let's get it squared away,  
6 and then we'll get to other things.

7 And they got their economy pretty well on  
8 track. And I don't know. There are probably  
9 arguments that it's not fully squared away. But  
10 they've sure come a long way.

11 And, now they're into some of those other  
12 things, looking at some of those other things. And  
13 there's a threat there. In your Pacific  
14 experiences, and so forth, can you talk to us a  
15 little bit about what we're -- one of our major  
16 concerns. And that is theater ballistic missile  
17 defense and deterrence factor, both in the Chinese-  
18 Taiwan Strait area as well as into the North Korean  
19 No-Dong threat, that sort of thing, and where we  
20 really are, and what IGPBS is doing to deter/prevent  
21 that threat on our forces and/or our nation?

22 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The Pacific plan, I

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1 think, took focus -- and rightly so -- out of  
2 Northeast Asia, where it was almost expressly based  
3 on the Korean Peninsula, and the ongoing armistice  
4 in existence there and the threat that that posed  
5 south.

6 And the IGPBS initiative that Admiral  
7 Fargo (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command) has espoused  
8 -- and that is, you know, currently part of the  
9 process -- is now focused on a broader view of  
10 partnerships and accesses in the Pacific.

11 And, you know, we've obviously emphasized  
12 our territory of Guam and even the Hawaiian Islands  
13 and what Pearl Harbor bring. When we view  
14 holistically the Pacific Global Posture portion,  
15 it's pretty robust and we believe is exactly the  
16 focus necessary to be of deterrent value and attempt  
17 to maintain the security environment status quo that  
18 we seek in the Pacific.

19 So I'm very much, again, a fan of this  
20 process. And I was very much committed to the  
21 changes that we were making in the Pacific. And I  
22 think we've got it about right.

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1           With regard to missile defense, there are  
2 obviously a lot of missile defense initiatives  
3 ongoing. I would tell you that, as joint task force  
4 commanders or as component commanders within a joint  
5 task force, we have been examining our theater  
6 missile defense responsibilities now for several  
7 years.

8           And the technologies to manage and command  
9 and control missile defense are already deployed and  
10 part of our day-to-day business. And, as you're  
11 well aware, we have some land based systems that  
12 have been in use in past conflicts and are available  
13 to us now.

14           And, as you allude to, the successes that  
15 we're seeing with regard to some sea based systems  
16 and the ongoing testing of our land based systems is  
17 going to provide the country even more in terms of  
18 missile defense capacity and capability.

19           So, the combination of the two -- The  
20 Global Posture in the Pacific that I'm familiar with  
21 was developed and accommodates, I think, the  
22 advances that we're making in missile defense and is

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1 precisely the kind of laydown that we need to  
2 achieve the level of deterrence and stability that  
3 we tend to gain with our partners in Northeast Asia,  
4 in particular.

5 COMMISSIONER LESS: Good, thanks. And a  
6 follow-on in the Pacific area again -- or theater  
7 again: is what we're doing with the Japanese  
8 Government and the laydown of our forces, as far as  
9 the posturing and our IGPBS in that particular arena  
10 -- is that sufficient to provide deterrence for the  
11 North Korean threat, if you will, as we bring troops  
12 out of North Korea?

13 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think the Chinese  
14 -- the Chinese, excuse me. I think the Japanese are  
15 very satisfied with what is being negotiated with  
16 them.

17 COMMISSIONER LESS: By going a little bit  
18 slowly; probably, slower than they want?

19 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Perhaps. But, in a  
20 typical fashion, I think. You know, we've  
21 progressed with them. But, I mean, they're  
22 exceedingly supportive.

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1           Having been homeported in Japan and worked  
2           very much around that archipelago and with my  
3           Japanese counterparts in the JMSDF (Japanese  
4           Maritime Self-Defense Force), I would tell you that,  
5           not only with our military partnership, but with the  
6           relations that we've succeeded in maintaining with  
7           the Government of Japan -- their support for the  
8           United States presence there for purposes of  
9           regional security, their interest in missile defense  
10          relative to the peninsula and, you know, other  
11          potential regional issues -- I think the Japanese  
12          are most supportive of this initiative that you  
13          oversee.

14                 And I think they are very satisfied with  
15          where we're advancing as a partner in Northeast Asia  
16          with them.

17                 As you know, for IGPBS purposes, Okinawa  
18          is certainly in focus and has been for a good amount  
19          of time. And we're attempting to accommodate what  
20          we can there in terms of maintaining a solid  
21          relationship with our Japanese partners.

22                 But, with regard to the Forward Deployed

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1 Naval Forces and other forward deployed service  
2 forces in the Pacific, I think our relationship with  
3 Japan is vital.

4 And I think the Japanese are satisfied  
5 that their security requirements, as we contribute  
6 to them, are certainly being met.

7 COMMISSIONER LESS: Thanks. And that's  
8 all the questions. Just one pat on the back, if you  
9 will: I applaud the Exercise (Operation) UNIFIED  
10 ASSISTANCE. You were instrumental in setting up an  
11 organization out there that was able to respond like  
12 it did. And you did us all proud.

13 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Thank you very  
14 much, sir. And I enjoyed flying on your wing. You  
15 didn't run me out of gas.

16 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Taylor?

17 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I'd like to follow-  
18 up on a question I asked you earlier. Maybe I  
19 wasn't very clear in what I was asking. That would  
20 obviously reflect the lack of specificity in your  
21 answer.

22 And I'm talking about process in the way

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1 that the IGPBS will be integrated into the BRAC  
2 process, not in any specifics. But, I know the BRAC  
3 Commission will start their work in earnest when the  
4 Secretary makes his recommendations to them in the  
5 middle of May. How would IGPBS be integrated into  
6 that?

7 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: It's a great  
8 question. And I'm sorry I didn't understand the  
9 focus of it when you asked previously. But there  
10 are really two elements to the BRAC submission, one  
11 of which is the force structure that I alluded to  
12 earlier that is across the Future Year Defense Plan.

13 The other are the recommendations for  
14 realignment and closure that obviously compliment  
15 that. And what has to be accommodated is the force  
16 laydown within the United States, to include  
17 territories and so forth.

18 So, when we say, will BRAC accommodate  
19 IGPBS? While the BRAC recommendations may not  
20 precisely define units that go to particular  
21 installations, it must account for the force  
22 structure that is in the United States, to include

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1 those forces that, through IGPBS, either have  
2 returned or will return to the United States.

3 So, the answer is, yes, they will be  
4 accommodated. The services are keenly aware of what  
5 the global posture effects will be with regard to  
6 their installations in the United States and what  
7 they have to accommodate.

8 And both the force structure and the  
9 alignment and closure recommendations are intended  
10 to be balanced.

11 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you. That  
12 clarifies it for me. I appreciate that.

13 I know a couple of questions I'm going to  
14 ask you now may be more appropriate for someone from  
15 the Services. But, you've been asked to represent  
16 the Services here today. So I'll give them to you  
17 and maybe you can take them back to them.

18 And it gets into this entire issue of how  
19 we synchronize everything that's ongoing with the  
20 return of forces from overseas, to include: the  
21 adequate funding that we addressed earlier, the  
22 military construction appropriate to develop the

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1 infrastructure, the aid, if necessary, to the  
2 surrounding communities that will be impacted by it.

3 And again, this is kind of a process  
4 question. But how do the Services or the Department  
5 plan to synchronize all this in a manner that can be  
6 accommodated in any town in the continental United  
7 States in a way that sustains the quality of life of  
8 our great servicemen and their families?

9 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I would tell you  
10 that their quality of life is certainly foremost in  
11 our decision process. I think it's well represented  
12 in the current President's budget that has been  
13 unveiled.

14 And I think in areas like housing, in  
15 particular, the advances that we made across  
16 Services, and will continue to make, have been  
17 remarkable. So, I think much of the investment  
18 that's been made in quality of life -- and pay, and  
19 housing, and in accommodating our families -- will  
20 be represented in whatever comes out the other end  
21 of the BRAC process.

22 In terms of coordinating all of this, as

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1 you say, it's a Service responsibility to do that.  
2 And you talk military construction, the resourcing  
3 issues.

4 As I mentioned earlier, there is, in fact,  
5 a program resource intended to accommodate the  
6 expense associated with BRAC at the onset before we  
7 start seeing the recovered resource that, you know,  
8 occurs in the out-years from BRAC.

9 So, we hope that we have that accommodated  
10 in terms of the resources that have been put away to  
11 cover that. And, likewise, those BRAC resources,  
12 the attend and aid to the communities, the  
13 involvement the communities have in whatever  
14 military construction projects are ongoing and in  
15 improving the base infrastructure, and so forth, are  
16 all intended to be captured in the cost of a BRAC.

17 And the Services must manage that along  
18 the way and -- without the specificity you are  
19 perhaps looking for, you know, I would assure you  
20 that -- with a focus on quality of life for their  
21 people, with the improvements that we've made in  
22 infrastructure and housing and communities across

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1 the nation that are part of the BRAC realignment  
2 closure. In some cases those, you know, facilities,  
3 installations that have already been improved are  
4 perhaps the focus of some of the efforts to  
5 consolidate, you know, into those areas.

6 So, I think the Services will have the  
7 necessary focus -- have had the necessary focus --  
8 and resources to accommodate an ever-improving  
9 quality of life for our soldiers and sailors, airmen  
10 and marines.

11 And I think they must and will manage  
12 properly the balance of these three things that you  
13 allude to.

14 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you. My final  
15 question revolves around the timing issue. Once it  
16 becomes public knowledge, both here in the United  
17 States and overseas, which forces are leaving from  
18 where -- and a lot of that's public right now -- I  
19 would surmise that pressure will build on both  
20 sides: a pull from here within the continental  
21 United States because -- from the Congress and the  
22 other people -- and a push from the overseas

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1 commands.

2           Could you comment on how the Department  
3 will resist these pressures in making sure that we  
4 do this right and we do the timing right? Because I  
5 think you've agreed that the timing is very, very  
6 important on all this to do it correctly, both  
7 strategically and for quality of life reasons.

8           I know there's not a specific answer to  
9 that. But I would be interested in your comments.

10           VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD:       There's not a  
11 specific answer.     But, having listened to the  
12 discussions with the Secretary that have occurred  
13 over time regarding this and similar issues, I would  
14 tell you that, you know, his answer would probably  
15 bet that we're not going to move anybody anywhere  
16 until we've got a place to put them and its an  
17 adequate place to put them.

18           And, I'm not sure that the push and pull  
19 that you -- while there may very well be a pull from  
20 this side to accommodate the movement of force, you  
21 know, force structure back to the U.S. -- I'm not  
22 sure there's necessarily a push from the COCOMs to,

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1 you know, to accelerate that.

2 I think we'll have to manage with the  
3 combatant commanders the timing of all this, the  
4 timing of the installation preparation that  
5 obviously has to go into this in order to meet what  
6 I believe would be the Secretary's priorities: and  
7 that is to ensure that we have the installation  
8 prepared as we bring the families and military  
9 members back home.

10 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you.

11 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin?

12 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Mr.  
13 Chairman. Admiral, as we travel around the world,  
14 we've heard a lot about jointness and the importance  
15 of jointness to the flexibility and the maximization  
16 of the facilities that we do have and the expansion  
17 of the network that we'd like to have.

18 If you want a purple effort, it would seem  
19 that there needs to be purple money. And the lack  
20 thereof or the adequacy of the funding and the  
21 purple stream surfaces to us as an issue when we  
22 hear of resistance on the part of an individual's

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1 Service to join basing because they're paying the  
2 bill and they don't want somebody else to use the  
3 base who isn't going to pay the bill. And we find  
4 that in the training arena, as well.

5 What steps are being taken to rectify that  
6 situation?

7 And the budget that I just saw does not  
8 include a whole lot of new purple money. And it  
9 certainly would seem it needs to if jointness is a  
10 hallmark of IGPBS.

11 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes. I would say  
12 that we don't do anything that is -- that lacks  
13 jointness any longer, whether we're overseas or, you  
14 know, in our training at home.

15 If we're not already training in a joint  
16 or combined environment then, as a Service, we're  
17 training to enter into a joint or combined  
18 environment.

19 And, as you state, part of the Base  
20 Realignment and Closure initiative is going to be to  
21 attempt to economize across the Services as well as  
22 within the Services.

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1           And both of those processes are ongoing.  
2           The -- it shouldn't be necessarily a lack of purple  
3           money that would cause, you know, would need to be  
4           on hand to initiate a joint project.

5           And, in the course of this process,  
6           without getting into the specifics because I can't,  
7           I have not seen the resistance that you allude to.  
8           There is a view on the part of the Services of their  
9           need to accommodate the efficiencies that they think  
10          they have to have.

11          There have been initiatives proposed by  
12          the Services that are consolidations of cross-  
13          Service functions. So, coming from the Services --  
14          not coming from the Joint Staff or from the OSD side  
15          of the house -- that makes perfect sense and gains  
16          acceptance pretty rapidly.

17          So, again, I'm not convinced that the lack  
18          of resources within a joint account is necessary to  
19          accomplish the jointness and the joint efficiencies  
20          that base realignment, closure, or IGPBS is intended  
21          to achieve.

22          And, I've seen on occasion the opposite

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1 from the Services. I've seen them team on some of  
2 these issues. And I think you'll be pleased with  
3 the result.

4 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: We're going to  
5 continue to monitor that situation closely.

6 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I'm sure you will.

7 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Having something to  
8 do with the difficulty of transferring money, which  
9 is an interesting exercise, I think, we'll be having  
10 some conversations with people about how that's  
11 done.

12 My second question for you, sir, is the  
13 log (logistic) footprint to support and sustain our  
14 servicemen and women who are now carrying the  
15 nation's banner -- Iraq, Afghanistan -- to do that  
16 at the same time as we're rolling up some sidewalks  
17 or proposing to roll up some sidewalks.

18 My question is, have all the attendant  
19 costs of combat services and combat service support  
20 requirements to sustain this new modular force been  
21 identified to the Congress? And are they fully  
22 funded at this point?

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1           VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think the short  
2 answer is, yes, in particular in this year's  
3 supplemental request. There was a rigorous process  
4 that all the Services participated in, the Joint  
5 Staff, and Office of the Secretary (of Defense), in  
6 terms of attempting to identify the real current  
7 cost of ongoing operations.

8           And the cost of war, to include combat  
9 support and combat service support, is most  
10 definitely captured in the supplemental request that  
11 has been submitted.

12           And it was scrutinized to be within the  
13 framework of, you know, what the supplemental is  
14 intended to contain. And, likewise, the budget  
15 undergoes a similar review. So, the short answer --  
16 the answer is yes.

17           COMMISSIONER MARTIN: I guess my follow-up  
18 to that, if I might, Mr. Chairman, is simply: does  
19 that include identifying where that support is  
20 physically going to come from?

21           Right now Iraq and Afghanistan are open  
22 questions as to their resolution properly in the

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1 hands of our National Command Authority. But the  
2 support and sustainment of the forces needed there  
3 has to come from -- are we going to be looking to  
4 close part of the log footprint that currently  
5 supports those operations as part of the BRAC and  
6 IGPBS?

7 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The priorities that  
8 have been placed on the decision making occurred --  
9 particularly attendant to the budget this year, that  
10 I can assure you is in play in the other initiatives  
11 that are ongoing -- is that we will support the  
12 current operation, that we will retain the readiness  
13 of the force, and that we will protect the  
14 transformation of our forces to be able to  
15 accommodate future challenges.

16 Those three things have remained  
17 priorities. The combat support, combat service  
18 support requirement for current operations has been  
19 a challenge.

20 And it has been a challenge because we  
21 were not necessarily shaped just right for the  
22 current operation in terms of our Active

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1 Component/Reserve Component mix.

2 And that was particularly true in the  
3 Army. Earlier I alluded to the adjustments that  
4 have been made, you know, over time in those areas  
5 to tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen,  
6 marines, you know, where we've attempted to re-shape  
7 that combat support, combat service support  
8 structure.

9 And, generally, that's what's been  
10 accommodated in those shifts of personnel.  
11 Likewise, modularity -- which is captured both in  
12 the Army's baseline budget and for purpose of the  
13 modularity that is the urgent essential need for the  
14 current operation for this war -- that modularity  
15 attempts to relieve the stress on the combat  
16 support, combat service support forces by infusing  
17 those elements into the brigade combat teams from  
18 what was formerly division support.

19 So, where the brigade combat team in the  
20 past has been reliant on combat support, combat  
21 service support coming from the division, it's now  
22 being embedded such that they are more self

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1 sufficient in that regard.

2 And we are modularizing the Active forces  
3 that are going to theater. And we are modularizing  
4 the Reserve Component forces that are coming from  
5 theater in preparation for any future rotation.

6 But, when we ultimately have a reorganized  
7 Army, we will have alleviated much of the combat  
8 support, combat service support and AC/RC mix  
9 problems that we have, you know, encountered over  
10 the past several years.

11 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much,  
12 Admiral. Mr. Chairman?

13 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. Admiral,  
14 in the first session this morning either you or  
15 Secretary Feith mentioned that it was felt that the  
16 current mobility capabilities were adequate for  
17 what's being proposed under IGPBS.

18 And we currently have 33 brigades, I  
19 believe, and moving to 43 to 48 brigades within the  
20 continental United States. And so it seems that the  
21 backbone of IGPBS is the ability to surge out of the  
22 United States.

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1           And I again repose the question: is the  
2 strategic lift still adequate under that scenario?

3           VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think the answer  
4 that we gave this morning should have been the  
5 accurate one, that the Mobility Capability Study is  
6 intended to identify that.

7           And, frankly, the capabilities mix that  
8 results -- adjustments that result from the Defense  
9 Review will likewise affect that. So, the analytics  
10 associated with Mobility Capabilities Study and the  
11 analytics associated with the upcoming QDR will be  
12 ongoing for the next several months to answer the  
13 question that you're asking regarding adequacy.

14           And we'll make adjustments to the program,  
15 if necessary, to get the strategic mobility mix  
16 right. The advantage is that we're looking at not  
17 only strategic lift to the theater. But we're  
18 looking at intra-theater lift, as well. And it's  
19 not confined to air mobility, but rather we're on  
20 the sea and looking at rail and looking at road  
21 infrastructure, as well.

22           So, this is a view across the force

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1 structure that we have for strategic mobility as  
2 well as intra-theater mobility. And it doesn't stop  
3 when we report out the results of the study at the  
4 end of the -- end of March, rather, it plays into  
5 the Defense Review.

6 And, in the end, we'll have the answer  
7 that you seek.

8 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Now, this morning you  
9 also indicated that the study, the MCS study --  
10 Mobility Capability Study -- was due in March. Will  
11 it be finished in March?

12 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: It's intended to be  
13 finished at the end of March. And I provide the  
14 analytic support for it. And I am concerned that  
15 we're still taking it through some data calls here  
16 in the final throws, you know, our final several  
17 weeks.

18 But, thus far, we believe we're going to  
19 make our deadline. So we have stated in a number of  
20 forums that the MCS report is out at the end of  
21 March.

22 And I'm confident it will be. We'll have

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1 a status certainly then. And portions of it are  
2 actually being out-briefed now. So it's just  
3 segments of the Mobility Capability Study, some of  
4 the intra-theater lift analysis, and so forth,  
5 that's still ongoing.

6 Typically we analyze this, give it back to  
7 the warfighters, and let them do kind of a rough  
8 order of magnitude sanity check of what has been  
9 analyzed.

10 And, if necessary, we take it back through  
11 quantitative analysis tools to do it again, if they  
12 don't like -- you know -- if they think the outcome  
13 is less than realistic.

14 So, we're working that and the excursions  
15 to finalize the result output at the end of March.

16 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: That's rather  
17 important to us. So, when that is completed, do you  
18 have an idea of when we might have access to that  
19 report?

20 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I believe -- and  
21 I'm not an expert in this -- but I believe the MCS  
22 is currently internal to DOD and intended to help us

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1 in the Defense Review. So, I'll have to get you an  
2 answer to that.

3 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. I thought  
4 you might have to get an answer on that one. But I  
5 would like to pose a question. The next one you  
6 should be able to answer, I hope, because it's right  
7 up your alley.

8 And that's the Pacific. We've had a lot  
9 of changes around the world, significant reductions  
10 in the European command; in the Pacific, more  
11 realignments, possibly, other than moving some  
12 troops out of Korea.

13 So there have been some comments about  
14 whether or not the basing in the Pacific will be  
15 adequate to address emerging challenges in the  
16 Pacific Rim.

17 So, if you have any comment on that, I'd  
18 appreciate it.

19 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think the answer  
20 is yes. I mean, I think the combatant commanders'  
21 initiatives, the Secretary's initiatives that view  
22 into the Pacific are viewing into the future

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1 challenges across -- you've probably seen the  
2 quadrant chart that's been used in the Pentagon that  
3 attempts to capture traditional as well as irregular  
4 and disruptive and catastrophic -- the different  
5 challenges that we think the future holds for us.

6 The traditional challenge has not been  
7 undermined by this. Rather, you know, we're  
8 attempting to fill, in terms of capability of the  
9 future force, all those challenges.

10 And my personal opinion is that the global  
11 basing that has been structured around the Pacific,  
12 specifically, that retained our presence in  
13 Northeast Asia and is gaining further accesses and  
14 capabilities and partnerships down in Southeast  
15 Asia, South Asia and Australia, is not only adequate  
16 but essential to the future challenges that we may  
17 face.

18 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: I'd ask if any of the  
19 Commissioners have another question.

20 (No verbal response.)

21 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: I have one last  
22 request of you. And that's in regard to what was

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1 mentioned earlier, in regard to SOUTHCOM and CSLs  
2 and also that if we might have a complete briefing  
3 on CENTCOM IGPBS plans and timing within the next  
4 two weeks.

5 If we could receive that, we would  
6 appreciate it. And Admiral, again, I'd like to  
7 express my appreciation for your patience in the way  
8 we handle this hearing and for working with us.

9 We appreciate it very much. We appreciate  
10 your service to our country. And we thank you for  
11 being here today.

12 VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Mr. Chairman,  
13 Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to do  
14 this. I'll look forward to getting these answers  
15 back to you on several of these questions.

16 And we would also look forward to informal  
17 discussions or perhaps classified discussions when  
18 you see the need. Thank you very much.

19 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: The Commission will  
20 now take a lunch break and reconvene at 1:30 p.m.  
21 with a representative of the Department of State.

22 (Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m. the above-

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1 entitled matter recessed for lunch.)

2

1 A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N

2 1:30 p.m.

3 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: It's my privilege to  
4 introduce the second panel. Joining us today is  
5 Ambassador Rose Likins, Acting Assistant Secretary  
6 of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.  
7 Ambassador Likins is a career member of the Senior  
8 Foreign Service.

9 She joined the Foreign Service in June,  
10 1981, and has served in Mexico, Paraguay, Bulgaria,  
11 and as Ambassador to the Republic of El Salvador.  
12 In Washington Ms. Likins has served in a number of  
13 leadership positions, and in the Department of State  
14 most recently as Deputy Executive Secretary of the  
15 Department. Welcome, Ambassador. And we thank you  
16 for appearing before the Commission.

17 We can appreciate the immense  
18 responsibility of the State Department in the  
19 unsettled world of today. And we asked you here  
20 today to better understand the State Department's  
21 view and position on our national strategy, regional  
22 stability, alliance relationships, and the

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1 relationship to DOD's Global Posture Review.

2 So, at this time I'd call on you if you  
3 have any opening remarks.

4 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Thank you, Mr.  
5 Chairman. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of  
6 the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to  
7 address the Department of State's role in the U.S.  
8 Global Defense Posture Review.

9 I'm pleased to be able to compliment the  
10 statements made earlier today by my esteemed  
11 colleagues at the Department of Defense with the  
12 State Department's perspective on the process and  
13 progress of this review.

14 The transformation of our overseas defense  
15 posture will affect many partners around the world  
16 and reflect the United States' commitment as a  
17 global security partner.

18 The purpose of the review is to strengthen  
19 the ability of U.S. military forces to carry out  
20 worldwide commitments while taking into account the  
21 new defense technologies and the new international  
22 security environment.

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1           The Cold War era threats facing our nation  
2           50 years ago have given way to the less predictable  
3           dangers associated with rogue nations, global  
4           terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

5           The Department is proud to assist the  
6           transformation of our military's forward presence,  
7           which serves to underscore our country's commitment  
8           to effectively address these challenges to our  
9           global security.

10          Since the President first announced this  
11          review in November of 2003, the State Department has  
12          worked closely with our colleagues at the Department  
13          of Defense to review the political implications of  
14          proposed changes to our posture, to balance military  
15          objectives with political and strategic necessities,  
16          and to ensure that our friends and allies are  
17          thoroughly consulted.

18          As has been previously stated, the review  
19          was guided, first and foremost, by the requirement  
20          to strengthen allied roles and build new  
21          partnerships. The State Department's role is the  
22          build the political and diplomatic framework on

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1 which our overseas military presence depends.

2 We want to ensure that our friends and  
3 allies understand and support the realignment of  
4 U.S. forces and, as importantly, work with us to  
5 achieve our common objectives.

6 The State Department will also negotiate  
7 any agreements to implement changes with host  
8 governments, including base access agreements. From  
9 the first days of this review, we have stressed what  
10 we consider meaningful consultations with friends  
11 and allies to be one of the most important elements  
12 to this process.

13 Our discussions on Japan and Korea have  
14 proceeded on a separate track, which the  
15 Administration began before the 2003 public  
16 announcement.

17 In our consultations in Europe, Asia and  
18 elsewhere, we have consistently addressed that we  
19 value and carefully consider the feedback from our  
20 friends and allies.

21 And, in several instances, we have  
22 adjusted our proposals to meet their concerns.

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1 These consultations are ongoing, and in some cases  
2 where there exists political agreement, we have  
3 already embarked on detailed negotiations to  
4 implement changes.

5 Extensive consultations with allies at  
6 NATO and with Russia have helped address concerns  
7 and manage expectations in Europe. Europeans agree  
8 that the U.S. military presence must be updated to  
9 address the new security realities and that all  
10 changes will be consistent with our treaty and  
11 political commitments.

12 In fact, many of them, as I'm sure you're  
13 aware by now from your own travels, are in the midst  
14 of transforming their own militaries. There remains  
15 no doubt as we move forward that NATO remains one of  
16 our most important strategic military partnerships.

17 The United States will continue to work  
18 together with our NATO allies to face common global  
19 challenges. The transformation of our military  
20 presence in Europe will help our NATO allies and  
21 partners to be more capable and response -- and  
22 reinforces NATO's own transformational agenda.

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1           Our European partners understand that  
2 Europe will not likely be the stage for a large  
3 conventional ground war. As Italy's foreign  
4 minister stated, in reaction to the President's  
5 August 16<sup>th</sup> speech, the Cold War is a thing of the  
6 past.

7           There is no longer a strategic need for  
8 heavy forces as the central feature of the U.S.  
9 defense posture in Europe. The United States can no  
10 longer expect that our forward forces will fight in  
11 place.

12           For example, most U.S. forces based in  
13 Europe have rotated through Iraq. And European  
14 counterparts understand that what we need now in  
15 Europe is lighter, more deployable, ground  
16 capabilities, a leaner command and support  
17 structure, and an increasingly strategic role for  
18 Special Forces.

19           Our intent to station a Stryker brigade in  
20 Germany in place of Cold War era heavy ground forces  
21 is an important statement supporting this  
22 transformational theme, and demonstrates our

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1 continued commitment to NATO and the trans-Atlantic  
2 relationship.

3 We have focused closely on the impacts of  
4 our proposals not only on bilateral relations with  
5 host governments, but also on the impact on local  
6 communities.

7 In this regard we have closely consulted  
8 with the Government of Germany, including at the  
9 state and local levels, utilizing public diplomacy  
10 and German media outlets to help ease to the maximum  
11 extent possible the natural tensions associated with  
12 anticipated reductions.

13 Germany is undergoing its own base closure  
14 process. And our consultations have been  
15 synchronized with Berlin's own internal realignments  
16 of German military facilities throughout the  
17 country.

18 In Korea, we seek to improve robust U.S.-  
19 Korean deterrence by realigning forward based U.S.  
20 forces. We passed significant milestones in 2004,  
21 including the Korean National Assembly's approval of  
22 funding for the U.S. to vacate the Youngsan base in

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1 the center of Seoul.

2 We have also agreed to a schedule for  
3 redeployments off peninsula through the year 2008  
4 and to move virtually all U.S. forces south of the  
5 Han River through a two phase process.

6 With respect to Japan, on September 21<sup>st</sup>  
7 President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi agreed  
8 that our common goal in the Defense Posture Review  
9 is to strengthen deterrence and the effectiveness of  
10 the U.S. military presence while addressing the  
11 concerns of our Japanese hosts in the community  
12 surrounding our forces.

13 This has been the basis of our ongoing  
14 talks. We have dedicated time and effort to ensure  
15 that other interested parties remain informed on the  
16 themes and objectives of our Posture Review and to  
17 maintain an open dialogue on the process of the  
18 review.

19 We have had conversations with our Russian  
20 and Chinese counterparts on the general aims of our  
21 Posture Review, and have provided them with  
22 assurances that this review is not aimed at any

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1 specific country, but rather at the reality of 21<sup>st</sup>  
2 Century security threats and the unpredictable  
3 nature of those threats.

4 Further, we have worked to ensure that any  
5 regions where we have not yet had formal  
6 consultations, friends and allies have been briefed  
7 at least conceptually on the strategic vision of  
8 this review.

9 Beyond Europe and Asia, our proposals seek  
10 to establish a network of U.S. locations and  
11 facilities to support and conduct the global war on  
12 terrorism, increase our ability to respond to  
13 contingencies, help our partners build their own  
14 capabilities, facilitate practical security  
15 cooperation, and improve access.

16 Changes to our overseas posture will be  
17 implemented over many years. As we work through  
18 issues collaboratively with allies and partners, as  
19 well as with the Congress, we look forward to  
20 continuing to advance these important discussions  
21 with our counterparts around the globe, and to  
22 ensure that any changes made to our defense posture

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1 fully support U.S. foreign policy.

2 Thank you for hearing my statement. And  
3 I'm happy to answer your questions at this point.

4 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you, Ambassador.  
5 I ask Commissioner Taylor to open the questioning,  
6 please.

7 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you for your  
8 statement, Ambassador. I appreciate you being here.  
9 My first question revolves around the deterrence  
10 value of overseas forces and whether or not this  
11 IGPBS -- as it has been laid out by the Department  
12 of Defense -- what it does to deterrence.

13 Is there a danger that actions related to  
14 the deployment of forces from CONUS would be sending  
15 an escalatory signal in a crisis, requiring a  
16 buildup of overseas capability?

17 Obviously if we had most of our forces  
18 back here and we had a contingency, we'd have to  
19 deploy them. What impact does that have?

20 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, as we've  
21 considered our need to be able to respond to any  
22 crisis anywhere, I mean world events of our

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1 generation have certainly demonstrated that we have  
2 needed to use our military in the Balkans.

3 In my year and a half in the Political-  
4 Military Affairs Bureau, and since I left El  
5 Salvador, we've had to ask our military forces to  
6 deploy to Liberia to help stabilize a situation  
7 there, to deploy to Haiti to stabilize a very  
8 explosive situation there.

9 And what we are attempting to achieve is  
10 in fact an ability to quickly operate in a wide  
11 range of places and to plan for the unplanned, if  
12 you will. I think the deterrence value of having an  
13 ability to go anywhere you need to on relatively  
14 short notice and have facilities in place enhances  
15 our deterrence capability, to demonstrate -- as we  
16 have demonstrated in the past, and I'm sure we'll  
17 demonstrate in the future -- that we really are a  
18 country with the ability to have a military force  
19 that has a truly global reach.

20 The tsunami response, I think, is just a  
21 phenomenal example of our ability to be where we  
22 were needed in record time. I mean, I do not know

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1 that any of us would have planned for a tsunami  
2 event like the one we experienced in December. But  
3 the fact that PACOM and Admiral Fargo were able to  
4 move all of those resources so quickly to be so  
5 responsive has done amazing things for our  
6 diplomacy.

7 The fact that we were on the scenes so  
8 quickly with the needed relief changed our image in  
9 a country like Indonesia that's so influential in  
10 that neighborhood and in the Muslim world.

11 I mean, it truly has opened doors for us  
12 that were closed just a few months ago. So, I think  
13 that our current capabilities with the addition of  
14 the system and the network we're seeking to put in  
15 place give us very strong deterrence values, sure.

16 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: You might also say  
17 that in the tsunami incident that you mentioned,  
18 that proved the value of forward basing, too.

19 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: It sure did.

20 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: They happened to be  
21 based in the right place for that.

22 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: And the tremendous

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1 value of those resources. I mean, we all know the  
2 tremendous -- the hundreds of billions of dollars  
3 that are invested by taxpayers every year in defense  
4 resources.

5 When we all talked about the millions of  
6 dollars of commitments that President Bush was  
7 making to the response, those millions of dollars of  
8 commitment don't include the cost of the asset and  
9 the fact that we had men and women trained, capable,  
10 and ready of doing that mission, in addition to the  
11 cost of the infrastructure.

12 So, it was an exceptional thing to do on  
13 such short notice. And, as always, our forces did a  
14 phenomenal job.

15 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: From a diplomatic  
16 sense, if you compare the value of having forces in  
17 place as opposed to rotational forces --

18 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Yes.

19 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: -- the neighbor  
20 versus the visitor concept. How would you assess  
21 that in terms of the way we might be viewed by other  
22 nations?

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1           AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I actually have  
2 practical experience in this matter in El Salvador.  
3 El Salvador is the host of one of the forward  
4 operating locations, which are a model for what is  
5 now called the CSL in the current plan.

6           And the relationship that we had with El  
7 Salvador -- I was fortunate enough to implement the  
8 FOL when I arrived there in August of 2000. And we  
9 went very carefully, like everybody.

10           You want to be careful of local  
11 sensitivities and not inflame people. But the fact  
12 of the matter was we went about building  
13 relationships in that community.

14           And even though the permanent party of  
15 people who were implementing the FOL was eight  
16 people, we were able to do -- use maximum advantage.  
17 We had P-3 (*Orion* patrol aircraft) crews that  
18 rotated in, not just from Puerto Rico -- within  
19 Puerto Rico, Rosy Roads (Roosevelt Roads Naval Base)  
20 -- but then from all over the Unites States. We had  
21 Georgia National Guard. We had folks from New  
22 England. We had folks -- we had Coast Guard out of

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1 Sacramento, California. But we always knew in  
2 advance when those folk were coming.

3 And so we took the opportunity, working  
4 very closely together with our FOL colleagues. For  
5 example, at Christmas -- we almost always had  
6 somebody before Christmas.

7 And so very often the units who were  
8 coming knew far in advance they were coming. They'd  
9 take up a donation drive, whether it was medical  
10 supplies or stuffed toys, for the orphanage.

11 And so, while we were there, we always  
12 made sure to do an event to have the folks reach out  
13 to the community and not just be flying our P-3  
14 around gathering the intel (intelligence) that we  
15 wanted to.

16 The other thing that we did in El Salvador  
17 was to improve the facilities. As we improved  
18 facilities that we were going to use we also  
19 improved facilities that the El Salvadorians were  
20 going to use.

21 To the extent that we had excess capacity,  
22 as we very often do with some of the equipment that

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1 we put in, whether it's to wash the planes or the  
2 stands for the engines repair, allowing them to use  
3 that equipment was a neighborly thing to do.

4 The most important thing we did was, after  
5 the earthquake -- you may recall in January 2001  
6 there was a horrible earthquake in El Salvador --  
7 and what our folks did at that point was become the  
8 command and control for the ramp.

9 Ramp space was at a premium. Planes were  
10 flying in from all over the world -- from Taiwan,  
11 from Mexico, from Singapore -- and El Salvadorians  
12 were quickly stretched in kind of their ability to  
13 handle the scheduling and the off-loading and the  
14 ramp space and the parking.

15 And we said, You know what? We know how  
16 to do that; let us do that. And so we stopped  
17 flying the P-3 missions. We waived off the planes,  
18 and we became the command and control for about  
19 three weeks of all those flights coming in bringing  
20 relief deliveries.

21 All of those things -- seeing how we  
22 operated, our outreach to the community, the

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1 improvements that were made to the facilities that  
2 were shared by us and by the El Salvadorians: we  
3 improved the roads, we improved the lighting, we put  
4 in a better fence for security. All of those things  
5 the El Salvadorians saw as benefits.

6 And then finally the *extremis* case of the  
7 earthquake built that relationship even though we  
8 had only eight guys there.

9 So I would tell you that yes, it requires  
10 everybody working altogether and planning to make  
11 maximum use, but I think visitors can have the same  
12 kind of effect.

13 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: If we assume for a  
14 moment that IGBBS is implemented as has been laid  
15 out by the OSD -- the President indicated that it  
16 would probably happen over the next five to ten  
17 years -- how important is sticking to that schedule,  
18 again from the geopolitical sense?

19 Does this have to be -- there are a lot of  
20 things that have to be done in bringing 70,000  
21 military personnel back from overseas and bedding  
22 them down someplace within the continental United

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1 States.

2 And there are many questions to be  
3 answered yet about exactly how that is to be done,  
4 many of them to be answered in this building. But  
5 highly important from a geopolitical standpoint is  
6 that this be done according to a rigid timeline.

7 Or is this something that can become a  
8 process we work over a period of time?

9 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I think from a  
10 variety of perspectives it is going to be a period  
11 of five to ten years. And you know, when we've  
12 talked with allies and partners, we've talked about  
13 a ten year timeframe as kind of the outside  
14 parameter for doing this.

15 I do think it's important for, you know --  
16 all of you will understand the reliability factor, I  
17 call it -- for folks being able to know what's  
18 coming and when it's coming.

19 In a country like Germany, for example,  
20 where there's a well-established process for closing  
21 down facilities or changing facilities, that's  
22 roughly a two year process from our past experience.

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1           And so, you know, the Germans have their  
2           own process that they have to go through and so we  
3           are going to have to work very carefully with them.  
4           So being on a timeline in that arena is going to be  
5           very important because we're affecting thousands of  
6           people.

7           With our Asian partners there, as you  
8           know, is also, in the case of Japan, a time  
9           constraint in the terms of political pressure.  
10          There are lots of folks living in the vicinity of  
11          our facilities who feel an awful lot of urgency  
12          about reducing the burden.

13          And so I do think that the timeline will  
14          be very important. Obviously, as you all know  
15          better than I, a lot of this is going to be driven  
16          by resources and DOD's, you know, having the  
17          resources to do all the things that need to be done.

18          But we'll be working closely with them on  
19          the timeline. It's something that we're watching  
20          carefully and working with our partners on.

21          COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: If I understand you  
22          correctly, it is your opinion once this is announced

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1 -- of course, a lot of it's been announced already -  
2 - that there will be pressures from within the host  
3 country for it to go ahead and be executed.

4           AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure. They're going  
5 to want to be able to tell local populations with  
6 some degree of certainty what's coming and when it's  
7 coming.

8           So I do think, yes, that it will be  
9 important to have a timeline and to give people a  
10 realistic timeline and something that they can work  
11 with.

12           COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Regardless of  
13 whether or not we're ready to receive them back here  
14 in the United States?

15           AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I think that's part of  
16 the process that DOD will go through in making the  
17 determinations. And obviously I don't speak for DOD  
18 and I wouldn't, you know, venture into their arena,  
19 but it will be important for them to know what the  
20 timing is.

21           I don't know that our partners will say,  
22 you know, here is your deadline. I think what they

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1 want from us is just a realistic sense of what we're  
2 going to do and when we're going to do it.

3 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you, ma'am,  
4 Ambassador.

5 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Thank you, General.

6 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin.

7 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much,  
8 Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, I want to baseline  
9 something to begin with. And that is in the  
10 coordination of the IGBBS process, which by my  
11 estimation is a three legged stool.

12 It's State Department, OSD, and the  
13 National Security Council. How frequently and how  
14 directly do you meet with all three agencies  
15 together to discuss this, and what metrics or  
16 graphics or method of measurement do you use to  
17 gauge the progress of individual elements of IGBBS?

18 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: First of all, thank  
19 you very much for the question, General. Let me say  
20 that from our perspective at the State Department,  
21 and particular in the Bureau of Political-Military  
22 Affairs, that the coordination on this effort that

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1 we have done since the inception has really been  
2 outstanding.

3 All of us in Washington are familiar with  
4 the interagency process and, you know, it's vagary.  
5 Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn't work as  
6 well.

7 I would be very comfortable holding this  
8 up as a model of how the interagency process has  
9 worked and has worked exceptionally well. We have  
10 been -- we, the State Department, were involved from  
11 the very beginning, recognizing that a lot of these  
12 decisions are quintessentially military decisions to  
13 be made, Department of Defense decisions to be made.

14 They, at the same time, recognize that the  
15 decisions they're making are going to have profound  
16 impacts on our partners. And it is our  
17 responsibility to ensure that we get the feedback  
18 from the partners and that it's fed into the process  
19 and given the weight that it needs to have in our  
20 process.

21 So that whole process of working together,  
22 first in the interagency and then working together

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1 to consult our partners to bring back their  
2 information and their view and their perspectives,  
3 has really been a model process.

4 As someone with now 24 years in the  
5 Foreign Service, I can tell you I've seldom been  
6 involved in a process that has worked in that  
7 respect as well as this one has.

8 We have met -- you know, depending on  
9 where we were in the process -- we have met several  
10 times a week. At least once a week there is some  
11 sort of -- at some level in the chain -- there is  
12 some exchange about, okay, where are we on the next  
13 steps?

14 We have maintained a couple of things.  
15 One has been a calendar. You know, we started off  
16 with a calendar of benchmarks and, you know, from  
17 the roll out, to the consultations, to the next  
18 steps.

19 We have also -- we are in the process now  
20 of doing -- have done a lot of our homework in terms  
21 of the agreements and the legal status of, you know,  
22 where are the countries where we think we're going

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1 to want to make changes or do things, making sure,  
2 you know, what is the menu of legal arrangements we  
3 have or might want to have, and doing -- we're kind  
4 of doing that homework at the current moment as the  
5 commands have been doing more in depth  
6 consultations.

7 So I would tell you we have kind of a  
8 matrix of tasks to do as kind of our metric as we go  
9 through and how far have we come and who's up next  
10 and who are the most ripe to go to the next stage of  
11 implementation.

12 But we have a very regular interagency  
13 consultation on that. It's a very collegial group.  
14 And obviously when you're working on a project like  
15 this you kind of develop relationships of confidence  
16 in one another as everybody takes on their role and  
17 becomes the master of their particular aspect.

18 So I think it's been, you know, a fine  
19 example of how to do things correctly.

20 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Is your office at  
21 State the office at State --

22 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: The --

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1                   COMMISSIONER MARTIN:     And do you have  
2 direct and regular interaction with the National  
3 Security Council?

4                   AMBASSADOR LIKINS:    We do, sir.

5                   COMMISSIONER MARTIN:     Single point of  
6 contact?

7                   AMBASSADOR LIKINS:    We do, sir.

8                   COMMISSIONER MARTIN:     Very good.    Threat  
9 -- the data and intelligence information that's  
10 developed through your resources, through the  
11 Department of Defense resources -- can you give us a  
12 sense of how much, of what is being done in terms of  
13 posture, in terms of presence, that you can be  
14 confident is based on a realistic and very current  
15 assessment of the threat looking forward?

16                   AMBASSADOR LIKINS:    Obviously, as you all  
17 know from your government experience, I mean, that  
18 is a perpetually evolving analysis that we all have  
19 to do everyday.

20                                   And the lesson in 9/11 is that we all have  
21 to do it very well in coordination everyday, that  
22 it's not enough for each of us to do our own but to

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1 be talking to each other effectively.

2 So, first of all, I would tell you that  
3 that has to be a dynamic and ongoing process. And  
4 it is. I think that the entire plan is a response  
5 to our perception and our belief that the threat is  
6 going to come from anyplace, literally anyplace.

7 And we have to be prepared to respond  
8 anyplace. And I think that is the underlying belief  
9 in all this that we are all very -- that we all  
10 share. That none of us differ from that belief that  
11 we have to be prepared for anything, anywhere.

12 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: General Taylor  
13 alluded in his question to something that I wanted  
14 to follow up on. And that is whether you get any  
15 sense anywhere that what we're proposing to do is,  
16 quote, stirring the pot as opposed to being  
17 provocative, as opposed to being deterrent or  
18 assuring to countries in a particular region?

19 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I don't think that  
20 anyplace where we have done consultations we have  
21 heard, no, no, no, don't do that. Obviously, Russia  
22 -- to take the most obvious example that comes to

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1 mind -- is very interested in what it is we have  
2 planned for reasons that we all understand from  
3 history.

4 At the some time, you know, we have a  
5 whole host of relationships with independent  
6 countries, and the United States is going to pursue  
7 those relationships with lots of different countries  
8 in that region.

9 But we have assured the Russians that this  
10 is not in any way designed to ring them or to in any  
11 way intrude unnecessarily. We have had very good  
12 conversations with the Russians.

13 We will continue to have those  
14 conversations. They've expressed strong interest in  
15 continuing that engagement and we are committed to  
16 doing that.

17 We are really looking for places where we  
18 believe we're going to need to be able to have  
19 access. That's fundamentally what we're doing.  
20 Nowhere do we have plans for a major new base  
21 anywhere near Russia or the former Soviet Union.

22 What we are really talking about is

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1 access, as you know. So I think that we will  
2 continue to be responsive and to be alert to signs  
3 of concern, but I think that comes closest to, kind  
4 of, your definition of whether we're being  
5 provocative or in some way stirring the pot.

6 Obviously China is a major force in Asia  
7 and in the Pacific. The United States has a very  
8 well-articulated policy of engaging China to become  
9 an international -- a member of the international  
10 community and engaging in all of the international  
11 institutions.

12 We, again, went to Beijing -- Under  
13 Secretary Feith and former Assistant Secretary  
14 Bloomfield -- went to Beijing to have a conversation  
15 about this plan precisely because we didn't want  
16 people to have misperceptions about what we were  
17 doing.

18 And we heard nothing there that made us in  
19 any way believe that they were alarmed by what we  
20 were doing. They appreciated the fact that we  
21 sought them out to tell them what we were doing.

22 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: We've spent a fair

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1 amount of time in the Pacific region and are well  
2 aware of the sensitive and high level negotiations  
3 going on with the Government of Japan.

4 We're very well-aware of the concerns of  
5 the people of Okinawa, as expressed by the governor  
6 and others, about elements the U.S. presence there.  
7 How important, from the State Department's  
8 standpoint, is it to bring these concerns to a  
9 conclusion?

10 We can understand from a military  
11 standpoint, but what about from the State Department  
12 perspective, how important is it to wrap that up?

13 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, we've been, as  
14 you know, involved in the conversations with the  
15 Government of Japan since 2002 as a part of DPRI  
16 (Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto  
17 University). The State Department is an active  
18 participant in that dialog.

19 Again, we and our Department of Defense  
20 colleagues have been joined at the hip. We have  
21 been through all the meetings together, through all  
22 of the consultations together, and we feel very

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1 comfortable that we're all working together on this  
2 effort.

3 The two plus two ministerial that  
4 Secretary Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld held several  
5 weeks ago with their counterparts -- I was at the  
6 table precisely because this is an issue that is  
7 important to our relationship.

8 We are -- we've had an excellent  
9 relationship with the Japanese as we've talked about  
10 these issues. Some of these issues, as you know,  
11 are very tough ones, tough ones for us and tough  
12 ones for the Japanese.

13 But the fact that the Japanese have  
14 themselves announced their own new defense strategy  
15 and are going through their own evaluation and the  
16 need to transform the Self Defense Forces again  
17 coincides very nicely, just as it does with Germany  
18 and what we're going to do in Germany.

19 Japan is going through the same process of  
20 evaluating their future defense posture, but also  
21 what they need to do to make the Self Defense Forces  
22 a modern, capable, professional force.

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1           So we are very much involved in that  
2 process.       It is very important, from our  
3 perspective, to finish the process that we've had  
4 ongoing for several years.

5           We've made good progress.   Most recently  
6 we have agreed on what we call the common strategic  
7 objectives, which is a very important piece as we go  
8 about getting to the details and the specifics that  
9 everybody wants to get to, but we all wanted to be  
10 certain that we were operating from the same  
11 foundations and the same principles.

12           So I think that it is important -- from  
13 many perspectives, not just a diplomatic one, but  
14 also Japan's perspective -- to finish the process  
15 that we've been engaged in for some years.

16           And I think we are getting there.   It has  
17 been long, but it has necessarily taken into  
18 consideration a wide range of things.   The other  
19 thing that I would mention, just because it will  
20 come up in 2006, which is the Special Measures  
21 Agreement.

22           We at the State Department are responsible

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1 for renegotiating the Special Measures arrangement,  
2 which is the support that the Government of Japan  
3 provides for the U.S. presence in Japan.

4 And we are responsible for leading those  
5 negotiations. We are just beginning now our  
6 preliminary contacts with the Japanese. And  
7 typically it's a multiple year arrangement, but  
8 we're just starting to make arrangements.

9 We'll have our first consultations in the  
10 next two months or so with the Japanese on that.

11 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: And to use the last  
12 45 seconds of my time, are those two things somewhat  
13 related: the DPRI negotiations and Special  
14 Measures? Is there a sense of linkage there at all?

15 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I mean, they'll be  
16 influenced by one another, but there's no formal  
17 linkage.

18 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Linkage, okay. And  
19 I'll yield the balance of my time. I believe one of  
20 my fellow commissioners will ask you about Bulgaria  
21 at some point here, so --

22 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Curtis.

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1           COMMISSIONER CURTIS:    The IGPBS schedule  
2           is clearly intended to be implemented -- fully  
3           implemented -- in the 2010 timeframe and is  
4           obviously targeted to that period after 2020 and  
5           beyond.

6           As part of the IGPBS planning process, has  
7           the State Department provided the Department of  
8           Defense with a formal geopolitical assessment out in  
9           that timeframe as an input?

10          AMBASSADOR LIKINS:    No, sir, we have not  
11          talked about a formal document.    We have not  
12          provided that.    It has been more kind of a changed  
13          interagency strategic concept that we all agree to.

14          COMMISSIONER CURTIS:    Thank you.    The --  
15          Mr. Feith, this morning as he was talking to us,  
16          talked about the importance of establishing the  
17          proper legal framework, particularly for our forward  
18          operating sites and our CSLs.

19          We're putting them in a lot of places  
20          where we haven't been before or haven't been on any  
21          kind of permanent basis.    Would you give us your  
22          perspective on what the status is of putting in

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1 those SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements), the  
2 flexibility and access agreements, and the other  
3 agreements for forced protection in these locations,  
4 and also your assessment of how well we would do as  
5 we move into some of the less traditional areas  
6 where we're putting these?

7           AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I would have to  
8 tell you that where we are right now on particularly  
9 the CSLs is incipient. I described a few minutes  
10 ago the process we've been doing -- of doing our  
11 homework, you know, going down and determining the  
12 exact status of the agreements we have with which  
13 countries.

14           Obviously, the big pieces -- the pieces in  
15 Europe and the pieces in Asia -- have necessarily  
16 consumed a lot of time and effort. Particularly in  
17 Latin America and Asia and Africa, we have less firm  
18 definition, certainly, with DOD and in the  
19 interagency, about exactly where CSLs might best be  
20 located.

21           That said, I can tell you that in the area  
22 of the Non-surrender agreements, Article 98 -- the

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1 so-called Article 98 agreements -- our goal,  
2 independent of global defense posture, is to have as  
3 many of those agreements as we can around the world.

4 We are currently at 99 agreements signed,  
5 89 agreements ratified with a wide range of  
6 countries around the world. And we will keep going  
7 after those, independent of this process.

8 So the Non-surrender agreements -- or the  
9 Article 98 agreements -- will support this process,  
10 but they are not only linked to this process.  
11 Similarly, SOFAs have been long-standing on the part  
12 of the Department of State and our military  
13 colleagues to ensure that we have as many SOFAs in  
14 place as we can.

15 We have recently asked our posts in Latin  
16 America to make a new run at Status of Forces  
17 Agreements where we have, typically, in most of the  
18 Latin American countries, exercise-specific SOFAs.  
19 That if we're going down -- right now we're doing  
20 New Horizons in Nicaragua -- that we do -- we have  
21 a SOFA that applies to that particular event but not  
22 a long-term, in-place SOFA. And so we will look to

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1 see how much progress we can make on SOFAs, again,  
2 independent of this process, just because it's a  
3 good idea to have them.

4 The -- those are the primary arrangements  
5 we need to have in place. I think, from my  
6 experience, the -- it's so country-specific that  
7 it's hard to generalize.

8 What works in country A may not work in  
9 country B. What worked in El Salvador wouldn't work  
10 in Costa Rica, for example. So it's a little hard  
11 to generalize.

12 I would tell you that there are a couple  
13 factors that will be important in our consideration.  
14 One of them is the host country's experience with  
15 the United States, their experience with the U.S.  
16 military.

17 Obviously, the political situation is  
18 always a factor, but also the state of development  
19 or undevelopment of their respective judiciary  
20 systems and the rule of law systems and whether or  
21 not their courts and their legal system is  
22 comfortable with the instruments we're proposing.

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1           Sometimes, particularly in the case of the  
2 Article 98 agreement, it has been so dramatically  
3 different from something that a local legal system  
4 has been comfortable with that we've had to do a lot  
5 of persuading and showing people how this is  
6 consistent with their own law because it is a new  
7 concept for them.

8           So the status of development of the legal  
9 system and the court system can sometimes also be a  
10 factor. But that's helpful.

11           COMMISSIONER CURTIS:     When we were in  
12 Europe we were shown what appeared to be a fairly  
13 definitive list of the CSLs and FOSs in Africa. And  
14 some of those were associated with the African Fuels  
15 Initiative and other ideas.

16           You give me the impression that perhaps  
17 that list is not as firm as perhaps we assumed it to  
18 be when we looked at those briefings.

19           AMBASSADOR LIKINS:     Yes. I think that  
20 everybody working in good faith has kind of put  
21 forward a lot of proposals, but as time goes on, I  
22 mean, I have certainly watched this process over the

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1 last year and a half kind of evolve from stuff that  
2 we thought we knew for certain at the beginning.

3 A year and a half later we thought, oh,  
4 boy, that didn't really make much sense, did it?  
5 And so the CSLs, I would tell you, are the piece  
6 that is still, in my -- from my perspective, most in  
7 flux.

8 And that is particularly true, I think, in  
9 Latin American and Africa.

10 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Well, that's a great  
11 lead-in because the charts that I have seen, as I  
12 mentioned, show CSLs scattered throughout -- and  
13 some FOSS -- scattered throughout Africa.

14 The Latin American CSLs seem to be limited  
15 to Central America, with nothing on the chart I saw  
16 -- essentially, very little -- in South America. Is  
17 that what you have seen and is that a -- what led us  
18 to that position?

19 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I would tell  
20 you, yes, that is the chart I have seen. I would  
21 also tell you that General Craddock, who took over  
22 in SOUTHCOM in the last couple months, is taking a

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1 new look at that and has not finished and has not  
2 made his final recommendations back to the Pentagon,  
3 to the best of my knowledge.

4 I was down there with him last week and I  
5 know that he is still actively engaged in having a  
6 look at that. I honestly think it was not, you  
7 know, kind of -- it was something that people had  
8 more as a target.

9 You know, we have to take a look at Latin  
10 America. They looked at the places where we already  
11 were, and so that accounts for at least half of  
12 what's already on that map.

13 And I think after that there is a -- there  
14 was a certain concern about receptiveness.

15 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Sure.

16 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: You know, if you have  
17 so many countries in Latin America who are not  
18 willing to sign Article 98 agreements with us  
19 because they feel very committed to the  
20 International Criminal Court, and, you know, if you  
21 can't get an Article 98 with a country, how secure  
22 are we going to be and how secure is Congress going

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1 to be in asking, you know, in wanting to establish  
2 something?

3 But I do think there's more to be heard on  
4 that subject.

5 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Okay, great. And  
6 one final question.

7 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure.

8 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: And this deals with  
9 Europe. You know, put your European political hat  
10 on. As we draw down, in some people's perspective,  
11 our forces associated with NATO, are we opening up  
12 the specter of more EU (European Union) military  
13 activity in lieu of NATO?

14 What do you see -- how do you see the  
15 IGPBS affecting the thrust that some NATO countries  
16 have to establish an EU military outside of the NATO  
17 structure: positive, negative?

18 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I don't think  
19 this particular effort is going to influence that.  
20 I think that they, as you well know, are a corps of  
21 countries who are very committed to an independent  
22 European defense identity.

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1           And the United States' position, I think,  
2           is the right -- to say, obviously, you should do  
3           what you think is important, but we all have a  
4           common commitment to NATO.

5           NATO is the organization that we've all  
6           invested five decades and billions of dollars in.  
7           It's been a successful effort for all of us. And so  
8           we want to continue to see NATO develop.

9           Obviously, there are transformation issues  
10          with NATO that we've all talked about, that we  
11          continue to work with NATO. We think that's an  
12          important effort to be ready for the future.

13          But if you look at Afghanistan, where we  
14          have gone out of area with NATO, with NATO lead and  
15          NATO taking on increasing responsibility for PRTs --  
16          the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, beyond the  
17          immediate environs of Kabul. NATO is evolving.

18          NATO is, I think, as someone who -- as  
19          I've said, who's been in the service for 24 years --  
20          NATO will always be, you know, an important  
21          relationship for the United States.

22          And it has just been a successful one and

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1 it is, in today's world, continuing to be relevant  
2 and to be successful. The fact that the NATO  
3 training mission in Iraq has been established --  
4 that the number of countries who have committed  
5 troops to support the NATO training mission in Iraq  
6 -- is also an important sign of NATO's continued  
7 importance to the United States.

8 So I think that everything we're going to  
9 do will continue to evolve with NATO. The fact that  
10 we intend to put the Stryker in Germany, again, I  
11 think, sends exactly the right signal to NATO and to  
12 the Germans that this is still an important area for  
13 us, that we are putting our cutting edge technology  
14 right there in the heart of NATO because we believe  
15 that this alliance is important to us.

16 So, I think that it doesn't take away from  
17 NATO. I think the European defense identity will  
18 continue on its path. The NATO Rapid Reaction Force  
19 is another important feature that we think will be  
20 increasingly important to us in the future.

21 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you very much,  
22 Ambassador.

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1                   AMBASSADOR LIKINS: You're very welcome.

2                   COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Chairman, that's all  
3 I have.

4                   CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Less.

5                   COMMISSIONER LESS: Ambassador, thank you  
6 for your time. When you're down this far down the  
7 list on the pecking order, the questions may overlap  
8 just a tad, I guess.

9                   But I do have a couple. And one involves  
10 the -- I mean, it's related somewhat to what  
11 Commissioner Curtis talked about, regards the  
12 relationship in the European theater.

13                   But I would talk to this one in terms of  
14 leadership, if you will, and put it on a worldwide  
15 basis. We are probably the last remaining  
16 superpower. And I know that doesn't -- using that  
17 term doesn't go over well in some areas.

18                   But if we start withdrawing troops, like  
19 we're talking about, withdrawing to bring back to  
20 CONUS, and the wrong people get the wrong look at  
21 the wrong thing, there is some potential that  
22 leadership suffers, leadership for our nation.

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1           And I would ask your indulgence to give us  
2 a worldwide perspective on how you think we will  
3 appear as a leader if we back away from maintaining  
4 troops forward?

5           AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Admiral, I think that  
6 -- to the contrary, that what Global Defense Posture  
7 is about is in fact being a global leader, to be  
8 prepared to be responsive anywhere we need to be.

9           I don't think that there is any doubt in  
10 anybody's mind of our President's commitment to the  
11 fact that the United States has a unique  
12 international role to play, and we are playing it  
13 all over the world -- whether it's Iraq, whether  
14 it's Afghanistan, whether it's Columbia, whether  
15 it's tsunami.

16           And so I believe that this statement that  
17 is inherent in Global Defense Posture is one of our  
18 willingness through the future to plan to be a world  
19 leader for the indefinite future.

20           It is something that we, the United  
21 States, must do. We cannot afford to pretend that  
22 there are parts of the world that don't matter to us

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1 anymore.

2 Every part of the world has to matter to  
3 us, and we have to be prepared to respond anyplace.  
4 So I think that this is about, in fact,  
5 consolidating and bolstering our capability to  
6 project.

7 I think -- or certainly the reaction that  
8 we have had from allies and partners around the  
9 world has not been, you're running away from us.  
10 Please, please, please stay.

11 Our allies and our partners entirely  
12 understand that transformation is not about numbers  
13 and boots on the ground. Transformation is about  
14 our political will to do what we need to do when and  
15 where we need to do it, and our willingness to  
16 commit resources to have the capabilities to do what  
17 we need to do.

18 And so I think that our allies have  
19 entirely understood that, whether it's our Asian  
20 allies, our European allies, our allies in the  
21 Middle East and Central Asia.

22 So I don't -- that doesn't worry me. I do

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1 think that we are preparing to continue to project a  
2 leadership role and our allies see it exactly the  
3 same way.

4 If you look at the reaction in Australia  
5 to Defense Posture Review where the Minister of  
6 Defense says, you know, yes, this makes sense. This  
7 is exactly what we are also thinking about.

8 I don't think that that's our intent, nor  
9 is it the way our allies are perceiving it.

10 COMMISSIONER LESS: I appreciate that  
11 answer; that's responsive. Next one then. Again, I  
12 have to pick up on something that was addressed here  
13 this morning by Secretary Feith.

14 He pointed out that the President has  
15 pointed the finger in the sternum of the State  
16 Department and said, establish a Reconstruction and  
17 Stabilization Office.

18 And that's sort of the first time that I  
19 had heard of this, and I think probably the first  
20 time the Commission has heard of that. I would  
21 imagine that the relationship with IGPBS would be  
22 one of not just countering threats and risks and

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1 things like that.

2 I would imagine it would encompass a lot  
3 more than that -- like UNIFIED ASSISTANCE or the  
4 tsunami -- fantastic effort, if you will, that the  
5 military supported, that our nation provided.

6 But clearly -- would you help us as a  
7 commission here to understand a little bit about  
8 what this Reconstruction and Stabilization Office is  
9 really designed to do and how it affects or gets  
10 into the IGPBS business?

11 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure. Secretary  
12 Powell -- in response to obvious urging from the  
13 President, but also working with Senator Luger and  
14 Senator Hagel -- spent a fair amount of time  
15 thinking about what we have now created as the  
16 Secretary's Office of Stability and Reconstruction.

17 Ambassador Carlos Pasqual, who was our  
18 former Ambassador to Ukraine and who is a  
19 development specialist, was asked to take on this  
20 mission.

21 And he is heading up a staff now of folks  
22 from the Pentagon, from AID (U.S. Agency for

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1 International Development), from the State  
2 Department, from all areas of regional expertise,  
3 and they are putting together a variety of tools.

4 The first is what you would expect: the  
5 more analytical kind of predictive tool, trying to  
6 see if across the U.S. Government is there  
7 information that we have that we know that helps us  
8 predict where problems might be coming so that we're  
9 not -- we don't have to try to be ready for 180  
10 countries, but that we are able to know with some  
11 certainty -- or at least a little bit of  
12 predictability -- where problems are likely to  
13 occur.

14 And those are indicators from economic  
15 indicators to political stability indicators to  
16 corruption indicators -- what are all of the things  
17 that should go into that mix.

18 And so they've worked with the  
19 intelligence community, they've worked with DOD,  
20 they've worked with AID, and they've put together,  
21 you know, their -- and they are still elaborating.

22 This is an effort that has been underway,

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1 I would say, for about seven months now. They --  
2 Ambassador Pasqual has visited all of the combatant  
3 commanders.

4 He has been down to Norfolk several times  
5 with Admiral Giambastiani down at the Joint Forces  
6 Command, and Admiral Giambastiani has been very  
7 supportive and has actually sent some staff up to  
8 participate in the exercises and in the construction  
9 of exercises.

10 They've moved on from creating that  
11 analytical tool now to starting to think about  
12 exercises. How do, you know -- the military,  
13 obviously, does important business in exercises.

14 Honestly, we in the State Department have  
15 not historically done exercises except for crisis  
16 management that -- every embassy does a crisis  
17 management exercise to be ready for bad things that  
18 happen, might happen, in that country.

19 But across the political board we have not  
20 typically done our own exercises. Ambassador  
21 Pasqual is now fully engaged in trying to adapt  
22 exercise methodology to the particular State

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1 Department set of issues. And that has just begun.

2 His vision -- and, again, I'm speaking for  
3 him and he is obviously -- could articulate this far  
4 better than I could -- but his idea and the ideas  
5 that he has talked about with the DOD is that  
6 whatever the contingency might be, that we should  
7 all be in at the beginning rather than having a  
8 situation like Haiti -- where it was primarily a  
9 military lead which then handed off quickly to State  
10 and the U.N. and the interagency community -- that  
11 we ought to plan from the very beginning to have an  
12 interagency presence.

13 Even though one particular agency might be  
14 in the lead at the beginning and hand off to  
15 civilian agencies later, we should all be in at the  
16 beginning.

17 And then we have a kind of -- have a  
18 method or a plan for how we're going to transition  
19 from crisis to post-crisis to reconstruction.

20 Obviously, there are lessons to be learned  
21 from Iraq. The Secretary has said very clearly that  
22 she wants to be sure that we harvest all of the

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1 lessons of Iraq as part of Ambassador Pasqual's  
2 effort.

3 And I know he has been -- he's has been to  
4 Afghanistan, for example, to look at what are the  
5 many things that have gone right, what are the  
6 mistakes that were made there that we can harvest,  
7 and he's doing the same with Iraq.

8 So, it is an important and exciting effort  
9 for us at the State Department to put together this  
10 capability. It is something that Secretary Rice is  
11 every bit as committed to as Secretary Powell was  
12 when he created it.

13 And I think that it will in the future  
14 enable us to do a better job of managing that  
15 transition from a hot conflict, if you will, to the  
16 reconstruction piece.

17 COMMISSIONER LESS: Good. Any link or tie  
18 to that -- that's the UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, looking at  
19 those countries like Malaysia and --

20 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure. We have -- I  
21 mean -- we've obviously briefed them about the  
22 Global Defense Posture Review. I think that it is

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1 not intimately linked to what they're doing.

2           They're aware of it. But I don't think  
3 right now there's any particular organic link. But  
4 there is clearly, you know, a link to all of our  
5 ongoing development assistance programs, to all of  
6 our ongoing efforts in all of the countries.

7           COMMISSIONER LESS: Let me take you, for  
8 my last question then, to the Pacific theater and  
9 the threat that exists in that particular arena from  
10 the ballistic missile proliferation that's ongoing  
11 in the arena and how we're handling it -- but from a  
12 State Department -- I would like you to comment on  
13 where we are.

14           I remember in 1986, in a meeting in the  
15 Chinese embassy, Ambassador Lord explained -- I was  
16 on the Joint Staff at that particular time, I guess  
17 -- and I remember Ambassador Lord talking about  
18 China's program and the fact that they had, at that  
19 time, stated that, hey, the economy -- it's the  
20 economy, stupid -- and that's where it's going to be  
21 and that's what we're going to look at and we're not  
22 going to look at anything else for a long time. And

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1 we'll get around to someday looking at our military  
2 posture and that sort of thing.

3 And their predictions, or their plan, has  
4 sort of played out the way they talked about it, or  
5 at least the way Ambassador Lord talked about it  
6 back in those particular days.

7 And, of course, the threat from the North  
8 Korean peninsula, too, on the No-Dong threats that,  
9 again, probably are having the capability of  
10 reaching the United States.

11 Your State Department comments on and your  
12 thoughts and ideas on that particular threat and  
13 where we are with countering that threat.

14 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Obviously, it is  
15 something of tremendous concern to all of us. And  
16 it's something that we talk with our allies and  
17 partners about.

18 Obviously the Japanese care very much  
19 about this. This is why the Japanese, for their  
20 part, for example, have decided to collaborate with  
21 us in the missile defense program.

22 So it is -- we have the same perception of

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1 the threat that you do, Admiral. We are very  
2 worried about it. We work against the problem both,  
3 as I said, with our allies, like the Australians,  
4 but also in the entire non-proliferation arena.

5 Proliferation Security Initiative, we  
6 think, is important in being able to work with  
7 partners and allies to get at the threat.

8 COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you. Someone  
9 rang the buzzer on me again.

10 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I know, I saw the red  
11 light. I thought I better stop talking, the red  
12 light's on.

13 COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you, ma'am.  
14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. One of the  
16 common themes that we've heard is that base changes  
17 resulting from Global Posture Review seem to satisfy  
18 military operational expediency rather than being  
19 based on a sound assessment of national security  
20 needs for the long term, and I want to take this  
21 back to the question -- I think that was asked by  
22 Commissioner Curtis - regarding, kind of, what came

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1 first: the chicken of the egg, in regard to State  
2 Department and DOD's interaction?

3 It would seem that the way foreign policy  
4 strategy should be developed is at the White House.  
5 And the State Department would develop that strategy  
6 and then military basing would support that  
7 strategy.

8 But what I heard you answer is that the  
9 State Department was basically trying to accommodate  
10 the requirements of DOD in regard to the IGPBS. So  
11 can you explain that for me?

12 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I'm sorry if I've  
13 given that misimpression, Mr. Chairman. Clearly,  
14 the President's directive to all of us was to be  
15 prepared to be responsive wherever the threat comes  
16 from.

17 And so both DOD and we are responding to  
18 our instruction from the President based on the  
19 White House's determination of where we should be  
20 going.

21 So I apologize for giving you a mistaken  
22 impression. We are not, you know, kind of just

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1 accommodating, you know, kind of an idea that sprang  
2 from DOD.

3 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: So there may be areas  
4 then where the Department of Defense has made  
5 suggestions that State Department doesn't  
6 necessarily agree with?

7 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Yes.

8 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: And would there be any  
9 countries where they made a recommendation? I don't  
10 need you to mention them by name now, but are you  
11 aware of countries where State Department has said  
12 don't make this change there, or --

13 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: It's been a very  
14 collegial process, where as we talk about whatever  
15 the idea might be. And our views have been welcome  
16 where we know that something will be particularly,  
17 politically difficult, we've said that.

18 Where we have said, well, a CSL there  
19 might be seen as threatening by a neighbor; well,  
20 okay, let's look at that again. So, I mean, it has  
21 been a very collegial interactive process.

22 And at no time, you know, have we felt

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1 like our views haven't been taken fully into  
2 consideration.

3 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Good. Now I heard you  
4 say -- and you repeated it twice -- that the threat  
5 from any place, anywhere. And I know we've heard  
6 that many times from the Department of Defense, as  
7 well, and I can understand that to a degree -- that,  
8 if we're dealing with terrorist type actions, that's  
9 acceptable.

10 When we start talking about traditional  
11 threats -- or near-peer or peer competitors -- then  
12 it would seem like we can identify certain threats  
13 and have an idea of where those threats might  
14 materialize.

15 Would you want to address that at all? Is  
16 there anything that I could have you add to that --

17 (No verbal response, only head-shaking.)

18 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: At a later time then?

19 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Yes, in this forum,  
20 it's a little --

21 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay. All right. We  
22 would appreciate the opportunity to visit with you

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1 then in that regard.

2 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure.

3 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: I'm going to read a  
4 question, so bear with me, but I do want to ask this  
5 last question. The presence of forces overseas is,  
6 ideally, designed to meet U.S. security needs;  
7 expanding the influence of the U.S. Government with  
8 foreign governments and people overseas and  
9 maintaining regional and global stability.

10 How would you describe the ways that the  
11 re-basing concepts currently planned support the  
12 State Department view of the National Security  
13 Strategy over the next several decades?

14 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Particularly as we  
15 look to do things in new areas with nontraditional  
16 partners, particularly the new NATO members, the  
17 opportunity to kind of have -- to take a  
18 relationship to the next level of partnership, to  
19 interact with host nation militaries, to create  
20 military-to-military relationships that, you know,  
21 have military value in and of themselves, reinforce  
22 the concept of civilian control of the military, of

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1 the role of a professional military in a democracy.

2 All of those things are important foreign  
3 policy and national security goals. And so I think  
4 that the effort to -- as we work with new and  
5 different countries than we have traditionally --  
6 that those very much advance and forward our foreign  
7 policies and national security goals.

8 If you look to Asia -- where we have some  
9 excellent security partners -- but, again, we will  
10 be looking in new areas, potentially, of cooperation  
11 where we can deepen existing relationships and  
12 friendships, but also, you know, be a force for  
13 stability in areas that perhaps are interested in  
14 looking to us to provide, with even a minimal  
15 presence, an expression of interest and commitment  
16 by the United States to a particular region.

17 So I think, again, that certainly advances  
18 our foreign polity goals. In the case -- going back  
19 to the case I know best -- in the case of El  
20 Salvador when, you know, the decision to put a  
21 forward operating location in El Salvador was  
22 somewhat controversial domestically.

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1           The former guerrillas that we all remember  
2 from the '80s are in the legislature now and have a  
3 plurality of the seats in the legislature. And  
4 we're quite critical of President Flores for doing  
5 that.

6           And he was asked by Jim Lehrer on the  
7 MacNeil/Lehrer show, why are you getting involved in  
8 what appears to be a U.S. effort in Columbia? Why  
9 are you getting involved in this? What is your, you  
10 know, motivation for this?

11           And President Flores was very honest in  
12 answering him and said, look, I'm a small country  
13 with limited resources. And the resources that I  
14 have available to me need to be spent on the health  
15 and economic development of my people and educating  
16 the young people.

17           I can't take on the Columbian narco-  
18 traffickers by myself. I need a big strategic  
19 partner. Who better as my big strategic partner  
20 than the United States?

21           And so putting that forward operating  
22 location in El Salvador says to the traffickers,

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1 you're not welcome here. Don't bother. I think  
2 messages like that are very useful in places like  
3 Central America where the government resources are,  
4 in fact, limited.

5 And it does assist them to have whatever  
6 presence we have there and to reinforce what they're  
7 trying to do domestically. So I think, from a  
8 variety of perspectives, United States foreign  
9 policy goals and national security goals are being  
10 advanced by this process.

11 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. I'm going  
12 to turn my page so I make sure that I don't miss  
13 anything. And I've got Bulgaria question written  
14 here in big letters.

15 Did anyone have a Bulgaria question? I  
16 guess I'll ask one then in regard to possibly basing  
17 in Eastern Europe or at least having rotational  
18 forces.

19 And I'll address it to both Bulgaria and  
20 Romania. That -- and I can pose particular  
21 questions: I guess I'd like you to just kind of  
22 respond in what you think the possibilities are

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1 there because of your history in that region.

2           AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Thank you. Well,  
3 clearly our, you know, having Bulgaria -- and  
4 Romania, for that matter -- as NATO members, when I  
5 served there, was a distant dream and it was  
6 something that we were talking about.

7           The current Foreign Minister, Solomon  
8 Pasi, was the President of the Atlantic Club, which  
9 is about the only forum in Bulgaria where American  
10 speakers were welcome.

11           And so everybody from Stu Eisenstat to  
12 members of Congress spoke in front of the Atlantic  
13 Club because they were the only people willing to  
14 give us a forum to get our views out in Bulgaria at  
15 what was a pretty critical time.

16           So, personally, I cannot say, you know,  
17 how delighted I am -- I can't say enough about how  
18 delighted I am that Bulgaria and Romania are new  
19 NATO members.

20           They've embraced their NATO  
21 responsibilities wholeheartedly. Both countries are  
22 participating with us on Iraq. They've lost members

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1 of their armed forces in the effort in Iraq.

2 But they are quite enthusiastic NATO  
3 members. They are both eager to work with us at  
4 Global Defense Posture. I think one of the  
5 opportunities that the European Command and our  
6 Department of Defense colleagues have identified as  
7 promising from both perspectives is, particularly,  
8 in the area of training. Being able to make use of  
9 facilities that they might wish to make available to  
10 us for training, the possibility of doing joint  
11 training with those countries -- again, reinforcing  
12 their NATO proficiency, their being able to operate  
13 with us to NATO standards, NATO rules of operation -  
14 - will be good for us and good for them.

15 So I think that, particularly in the area  
16 of Bulgaria and Romania, our initial thought is in  
17 the area of training. But you know, we are at the  
18 beginning of a conversation with them about how best  
19 to develop that.

20 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Do any of the  
21 Commissioners have a follow-up question they'd like  
22 to ask? Commissioner Martin.

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1                   COMMISSIONER MARTIN:       Thank you, Mr.  
2                   Chairman.       Just a couple of clarifications,  
3                   Ambassador, if I might.    Is the Department of  
4                   Defense not specifying completely what it needs when  
5                   it talks about wanting to locate a CSL in a  
6                   particular country or region?

7                   Maybe I misheard because I thought there  
8                   was some disconnect that -- maybe they were telling  
9                   you everything you needed other (than to) know.

10                  AMBASSADOR LIKINS:   No, I think it's more  
11                  a process of change that has gone on from where we  
12                  started as we've thought through the process.   I  
13                  would tell you that we have most certainty about the  
14                  so-called big pieces -- about, you know, Asia, about  
15                  Europe.

16                  The CSLs, because there will be so many of  
17                  them and they will be in far-flung locations and  
18                  they'll have to be treated kind of one at a time,  
19                  have been the ones that we have not addressed in the  
20                  level of detail that we have the other bigger  
21                  pieces.

22                  It is not that there has been any lack of

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1 sharing of information, but rather a lack of final  
2 definition of our end plans.

3 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: My second and final  
4 question was that you mentioned that some locations  
5 or arrangements with countries were actually being  
6 undertaken by State because of State Department  
7 reasons that were not particularly requested or  
8 specifically requested by DOD.

9 Do you keep DOD informed of where you are  
10 in that process?

11 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Absolutely.

12 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: So they know what  
13 the menu might be?

14 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Absolutely. In fact,  
15 obviously, in the Article 98 agreements, for  
16 example, as we negotiate them, they're almost always  
17 a part of the team.

18 If we have to send a team to a capital, we  
19 try to do as much of it in Washington as we can to  
20 be cost-effective. But when we have to go out to  
21 capitals, they are always invited -- whether it's a  
22 Department of Defense attorney or somebody from the

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1 military staff, they are always invited.

2 Sometimes they go, sometimes they don't.  
3 But it is not a lack of coordination. We are very  
4 tightly lashed up on that.

5 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you,  
6 Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Curtis.

8 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Ambassador, I would  
9 like to hear your opinions on where we're going with  
10 Turkey. Clearly, I've watched our relation with  
11 Turkey over a lot of years, from my years in the Air  
12 Force, and it's always been an evolving process.  
13 And it's been in the news a good deal lately.

14 Will you share your perceptions on where  
15 we are with Turkey on the various legal arrangements  
16 that we'd like to put in place?

17 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure. Turkey, as a  
18 NATO ally, as you know, throughout the Cold War,  
19 played a very critical role for all of us. Incirlik  
20 is, I'm sure, well known to everybody in the United  
21 States Air Force.

22 The generosity of the Government of Turkey

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1 in working with us in the use of that facility has  
2 been important to us on any number of occasions. I  
3 remember in my days in Sophia wanting to, you know -  
4 - moving stuff through Turkey for the Balkans when,  
5 in those days, we couldn't bring a train across  
6 Bulgaria because the Socialist-controlled  
7 legislature wouldn't allow materials of war to cross  
8 the national territory to get to the Balkans coming  
9 from Turkey.

10 And so, you know, we had to be very  
11 creative in working with the Turks to find a way to  
12 get stuff to our troops. So, obviously, the  
13 relationship with Turkey is long and deep and starts  
14 from the fact that we're NATO allies.

15 We will continue to consult closely with  
16 Turkey. There have, as yet, been no formal requests  
17 put to them. Obviously, events in their  
18 neighborhood have been of intense concern to the  
19 Turks.

20 Turkey, like many of the countries in the  
21 region, is also undergoing its own political  
22 transformation and development and we need to be

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1 respectful of that, in my humble opinion.

2 So, I think that we have every expectation  
3 that we will continue to enjoy with Turkey the same  
4 degree of cooperation and close collaboration as  
5 allies that we have in the past.

6 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you,  
7 Ambassador.

8 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: You're very welcome.

9 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Taylor.

10 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Ms. Ambassador,  
11 you're obviously very familiar with the various  
12 permanent bases that we will be closing as we bring  
13 out approximately 70,000 in various places of the  
14 world.

15 What is the likelihood that we could move  
16 back into those same places or in those same  
17 countries again sometime, if we change our mind?

18 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: General, I think that  
19 really depends on what country and which base you're  
20 talking about. Obviously, the place where the most  
21 -- the biggest numbers we're talking about is  
22 Germany, where we're going to, you know, reduce a

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1 fairly large number of facilities.

2 The Germans, as I mentioned, are going  
3 through their own process of transformation and to  
4 the extent that there is a facility that we are no  
5 longer going to use and the Germans decide to use  
6 it, there might be a future ability to go back to a  
7 facility like that.

8 To the extent that a facility is  
9 completely closed and turned over to civilian use  
10 and becomes a university or an airport, obviously,  
11 practicalities tell you it's a little tougher to go  
12 back with the same military footprint that we might  
13 have once had.

14 So, I'm sorry to say, I think it will be  
15 very dependent on which facilities and what host  
16 governments do with them after we move on.

17 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I was talking about  
18 a little boarder perspective than individual  
19 installations or --

20 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure.

21 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: -- facilities over  
22 there -- but just access, regaining access, at that

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1 level in these countries.

2 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Oh, oh, sure. I think  
3 that -- I don't know -- in all of these countries we  
4 have alliance relationships -- and I think in --  
5 whether we're talking about Germany or we're talking  
6 about Japan and Korea, I mean, these are core  
7 alliances for the United States.

8 And in each case we are a core partner for  
9 that country. And I feel very confident that should  
10 the need arise that we would be able to have  
11 productive conversations with our allies.

12 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

13 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, you've been a  
14 great witness.

15 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, thank you.

16 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: It's been a pleasure  
17 having you here and we thank you for your time away  
18 from your busy schedule. And your insight will be  
19 invaluable to us as we move forward with our  
20 deliberations.

21 We would like to follow up with a meeting  
22 over at State with you sometime in the next two or

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1 three weeks to -- where we can address some of the  
2 other questions that we couldn't address today.

3 AMBASSADOR LIKINS: IT would be my  
4 pleasure.

5 CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. And to the  
6 members of the general public, press and others, we  
7 thank you for your attendance -- you for attending  
8 and for your interest in these important issues that  
9 affect the defense of our nation.

10 Future public meetings and hearings will  
11 be announced and appropriately published prior to  
12 their scheduled date. This concludes the March 1st,  
13 2005, hearing of the Overseas Basing Commission.

14 (Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m. the above-  
15 entitled hearing was concluded.)

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